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Abstract	  
	  
The	   relationship	  between	   religion	  and	  morality	  has	   long	  been	  hotly	  debated.	  Does	  
religion	   make	   us	   more	   moral?	   Is	   it	   necessary	   for	   morality?	   Do	   moral	   inclinations	  
emerge	   independently	   of	   religious	   intuitions?	   These	   debates,	   which	   nowadays	  
rumble	  on	  in	  scientific	  journals	  as	  well	  as	  in	  public	  life,	  have	  frequently	  been	  marred	  
by	  a	   series	  of	   conceptual	   confusions	  and	   limitations.	  Many	   scientific	   investigations	  
have	   failed	   to	   decompose	   ‘religion’	   and	   ‘morality’	   into	   theoretically	   grounded	  
elements;	   have	   adopted	   parochial	   conceptions	   of	   key	   concepts	   –	   in	   particular,	  
sanitised	   conceptions	  of	   ‘prosocial’	   behaviour;	   and	  have	  neglected	   to	   consider	   the	  
complex	   interplay	  between	  cognition	  and	  culture.	  We	  argue	  that	  to	  make	  progress	  
the	  categories	  ‘religion’	  and	  ‘morality’	  must	  be	  fractionated	  into	  a	  set	  of	  biologically	  
and	  psychologically	  cogent	  traits,	  revealing	  the	  cognitive	  foundations	  that	  shape	  and	  
constrain	  relevant	  cultural	  variants.	  We	  adopt	  this	  fractionating	  strategy,	  setting	  out	  
an	   encompassing	   evolutionary	   framework	   within	   which	   to	   situate	   and	   evaluate	  
relevant	   evidence.	   Our	   goals	   are	   twofold:	   to	   produce	   a	   detailed	   picture	   of	   the	  
current	   state	   of	   the	   field,	   and	   to	   provide	   a	   road	   map	   for	   future	   research	   on	   the	  
relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  morality.	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It	  is	  simply	  impossible	  for	  people	  to	  be	  moral	  without	  religion	  or	  God.	  
	  
~	  Laura	  Schlessinger	  (quoted	  in	  Zuckerman,	  2008)	  
	  
Faith	   can	   be	   very	   very	   dangerous,	   and	   deliberately	   to	   implant	   it	   into	   the	   vulnerable	   mind	   of	   an	  
innocent	  child	  is	  a	  grievous	  wrong.	  
	  
~	  Richard	  Dawkins	  (2006,	  p.	  348)	  
	  
The	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  morality	  requires	  religion	  is	  both	  topical	  and	  ancient.	  
In	   the	  Euthyphro,	   Socrates	   famously	  asked	  whether	  goodness	   is	   loved	  by	   the	  gods	  
because	   it	   is	   good,	   or	  whether	   goodness	   is	   good	   because	   it	   is	   loved	   by	   the	   gods.	  
Although	  he	  favoured	  the	  former	  proposal,	  many	  others	  have	  argued	  that	  morality	  is	  
dictated	   by	   –	   and	   indeed	   unthinkable	   without	   –	   God:	   “If	   God	   does	   not	   exist,	  
everything	   is	   permitted”	   (Dostoevsky,	   1880/1990). 1 	  Echoing	   this	   refrain,	  
conservatives	   like	   to	   claim	   that	   “declining	   moral	   standards”	   are	   at	   least	   partly	  
attributable	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   secularism	   and	   the	   decline	   of	   organized	   religion	   (see	  
Zuckerman,	  2008).	  
	  
The	   notion	   that	   religion	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	   morality	   is	   widespread	   and	   deeply	  
ingrained.	   More	   than	   half	   of	   Americans	   share	   Laura	   Schlessinger’s	   belief	   that	  
morality	   is	   impossible	   without	   belief	   in	   God	   (Pew	   Research	   Center,	   2007),	   and	   in	  
many	   countries	   this	   attitude	   is	   far	   more	   prevalent	   (see	   Figure	   1).	   In	   a	   series	   of	  
compelling	   recent	   studies,	   Gervais	   and	   colleagues	   (Gervais,	   Shariff	   &	   Norenzayan,	  
2011;	   see	   also	   Gervais,	   2011,	   2013a,	   2014a;	   Gervais	   &	   Norenzayan,	   2012b,	   2013)	  
have	  demonstrated	  strong	  implicit	  associations	  of	  atheists	  with	  immorality.	  Although	  
these	   associations	   are	   stronger	   in	   people	   who	   themselves	   believe	   in	   God,	   even	  
atheist	   participants	   intuitively	   view	   acts	   such	   as	   serial	   murder,	   incest	   and	  
necrobestiality	  as	  more	  representative	  of	  atheists	  than	  of	  other	  religious,	  ethnic,	  or	  
cultural	   groups	   (Gervais,	   2014). 2 	  Unsurprisingly,	   atheists	   explicitly	   disavow	   this	  
connection,	  with	  some	  even	  suggesting	  that	  atheists	  are	  “the	  moral	  backbone	  of	  the	  
nation…	  tak[ing]	  their	  civic	  duties	  seriously	  precisely	  because	  they	  don’t	  trust	  God	  to	  
save	   humanity	   from	   its	   follies”	   (Dennett,	   2003).	   Other	   non-­‐theists	   have	   taken	   a	  
softer	   line,	   arguing	   that	   moral	   inclinations	   are	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   our	   evolved	  
psychology,	   flourishing	   quite	   naturally	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   religious	   indoctrination	  
(Pyysiäinen	  &	  Hauser,	  2010).	  
	  
______________________________	  
                                                
1	  Here	   we	   conflate	   two	   different	   senses	   in	   which	   morality	   may	   require	   God.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  
morality	  may	  require	  God	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  morality	  is	  incoherent	  without	  God	  (i.e.,	  
without	  God,	   there	   is	  no	  basis	   for	  ethics).	  This	   is	  what	  Socrates	  had	   in	  mind	  (and	  disputed).	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  morality	  may	   require	  God	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   (belief	   in)	  God	   is	  needed	   to	  enforce	  moral	  
behaviour.	   This	   is	  what	  Dostoevsky	  meant.	   Partly	   for	   rhetorical	   effect	   here	  we	  have	  presented	   the	  
Socrates	  view	  and	  the	  Dostoevsky	  view	  as	  opposing	  but	  strictly	  speaking	  they	  could	  both	  be	  valid	  –	  
e.g.,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  morality	  is	  coherent	  without	  God	  (Socrates),	  but	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  
God's	  punishment	  is	  required	  for	  anybody	  to	  actually	  act	  morally	  (Dostoevsky).	  	  
2	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  atheists	  and	  believers	  alike	  view	  good	  deeds	  as	  less	  moral	  if	  they	  are	  performed	  
for	  religious	  reasons	  (Gervais,	  2014b).	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Although	   there	   is	   no	   shortage	   of	   lively	   polemic,	   scientific	   investigations	   of	   the	  
connection	  between	  religion	  and	  morality	  have	  so	   far	  produced	  mixed	  results.	  The	  
interpretive	  difficulties	  are	  exacerbated	  by	   imprecise	  conceptions	  both	  of	   ‘religion’	  
and	  ‘morality’.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  these	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  the	  same	  ways	  by	  those	  on	  
different	   sides	   of	   the	   divide	   discussed	   above,	   or	   even	   within	   seemingly	   opposing	  
camps.	   To	  make	   progress	   on	   this	   issue	  we	   require	   a	  more	   precise	   specification	   of	  
which	  human	  virtues	  are	  under	  consideration	  and	  which	   features	  of	   religion	  might	  
be	  thought	  to	  influence	  their	  expression.	  Our	  aim	  in	  what	  follows	  will	  be	  to	  sort	  out	  
some	  of	   the	   conceptual	   confusions	  and	   to	  provide	  a	   clear	  evolutionary	   framework	  
within	  which	  to	  situate	  and	  evaluate	  relevant	  evidence.	  	  
	  
We	   begin	   by	   highlighting	   a	   set	   of	   conceptual	   limitations	   hampering	   contemporary	  
academic	   discourse	   on	   this	   topic.	   In	   our	   view,	   many	   current	   investigations	   suffer	  
from	  1)	  a	   failure	   to	   fractionate	   ‘religion’	  and	   ‘morality’	   into	   theoretically	  grounded	  
units;	  2)	  ethnocentric	  conceptions	  of	  religion	  and	  morality;	  in	  particular,	  3)	  sanitised	  
conceptions	  of	  prosocial	  behaviour;	  and	  4)	  a	  tendency	  to	  conceptualize	  morality	  or	  
religion	   as	   clusters	   of	   either	   cognitively	   or	   culturally	   evolved	   features	   rather	   than	  
both.	   To	   circumvent	   these	  problems,	  we	  advocate	   a	   cross-­‐culturally	   encompassing	  
approach	   that	   fractionates	  both	   religion	  and	  morality	  while	  carefully	  distinguishing	  
cognition	   from	   culture.	   A	   thoroughgoing	   exploration	   of	   the	   religion-­‐morality	  
relationship	  must	  seek	  to	  establish	  the	  evolved	  cognitive	  systems	  that	  underpin	  the	  
astonishing	   diversity	   of	   cultural	   concepts,	   norms	   and	   behaviours	   that	   are	   labeled	  
(perhaps	   arbitrarily)	   ‘religion’	   and	   ‘morality’.	   Accordingly,	   drawing	   on	   ‘Moral	  
Foundations	  Theory’	  (e.g.,	  Graham	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  we	  outline	  sets	  of	  cognitive	  systems	  
commonly	  associated	  with	  these	  concepts	  and	  consider	  whether	  their	  evolutionary	  
histories	   might	   be	   somehow	   entwined.	  We	   go	   on	   to	   consider	   the	   quite	   separate	  
question	   of	   whether	   the	   evolution	   of	   religions	   as	   cultural	   systems	   has	   selectively	  
favoured	  moral	  values	  of	  various	  kinds.	  In	  the	  process	  we	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  
review	  of	  research	  on	  the	  religion-­‐morality	  relationship.	  
	  
Conceptual	  Lacunae	  and	  Confusions	  in	  the	  Religion	  and	  Morality	  Debate	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  confident	  claims	  of	  many	  contemporary	  commentators,	  we	  believe	  the	  
relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  morality	   is	  poorly	  understood.	   In	  our	  view	  this	   is	  
because	   debates	   about	   religion	   and	   morality	   are	   marred	   by	   a	   set	   of	   interrelated	  
conceptual	   lacunae	   and	   confusions.	  Our	   aim	   in	   this	   section	   is	   to	   enumerate	   these	  
shortcomings	  and	  to	  highlight	  some	  of	  their	  serious	  consequences.	  
	  
Astrologising	  
History	   can	   be	  written	   at	   any	  magnification.	  One	   can	  write	   the	   history	   of	   the	   universe	   on	   a	   single	  
page,	  or	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  a	  mayfly	  in	  forty	  volumes.	  
	  
~	  Norman	  Davies	  (1997,	  p.	  1)	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Just	  as	  history	  can	  be	  written	  at	  any	  magnification,	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  
and	   morality	   can	   be	   explored	   at	   any	   granularity.	   At	   the	   extremes,	   one	   can	   treat	  
‘religion’	   and	   ‘morality’	   as	   monolithic	   entities	   and	   attempt	   to	   characterise	   their	  
relationship,	  or	  one	  can	  study	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  particular	  theological	  doctrine	  (e.g.,	  
predestination)	  on	  some	  highly	  specific	  moral	  outcome	  (e.g.,	  tithing).	  The	  challenge	  
is	   to	  adopt	  a	  pragmatic	  and	  theoretically	  defensible	  scale	  of	  analysis.	  One	  problem	  
with	  the	  coarse-­‐grained	  (monolithic)	  approach	  is	  that	  religion,	  like	  the	  constellation	  
Orion	   in	   the	   night	   sky,	   may	   not	   reflect	   a	   real	   natural	   structure,	   but	   may	   instead	  
comprise	  a	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  arbitrary	  gathering	  of	  disparate	  features.	  Researchers	  in	  the	  
discipline	  of	  cognitive	  neuropsychiatry	  view	  psychiatric	  syndromes	  as	  culturally	  and	  
historically	   contingent	   constellations	   of	   symptoms,	   and	   argue	   that	   the	   unit	   of	  
investigation	   should	   be	   the	   symptom	   (e.g.,	   delusions)	   rather	   than	   the	   syndrome	  
(e.g.,	   schizophrenia)	   (Coltheart,	   Langdon	   &	   McKay,	   2011).	   Likewise,	   progress	   in	  
understanding	   the	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	   morality	   may	   require	  
fractionating	  these	  hazy	  concepts	  into	  more	  basic	  units.	  
	  
Many	   authors	   have	   attempted	   to	   identify	   the	   fundamental	   elements	   of	   religion.	  
Saroglou	  (2011),	  for	  instance,	  has	  put	  forward	  a	  detailed	  psychological	  model	  of	  the	  
“Big	   Four	   religious	   dimensions”,	   providing	   an	   illuminating	   taxonomy	   of	   core	  
components	   of	   religiosity	   that	   integrates	   numerous	   previous	   formulations	   in	   the	  
psychology	  and	  sociology	  of	  religion.	  In	  brief,	  for	  Saroglou,	  to	  be	  religious	  entails:	  
i) Believing:	   Holding	   a	   set	   of	   beliefs	   about	   transcendent	   entities	   (e.g.,	  
personal	  Gods,	  impersonal	  life	  forces,	  karmic	  principles).	  
ii) Bonding:	   Having	   self-­‐transcendent,	   emotional	   experiences,	   typically	  
through	  ritual	  (whether	  private	  or	  public,	  frequent	  or	  rare),	  that	  connect	  
one	  to	  others	  and	  to	  a	  deeper	  reality.	  
iii) Behaving:	  Subscribing	  to	  certain	  moral	  norms,	  and	  exerting	  self-­‐control	  to	  
behave	  in	  accordance	  with	  these	  norms.	  
iv) Belonging:	   Identifying	   and	   affiliating	   with	   a	   certain	   community	   or	  
tradition.	  
	  
Note	   that	  any	  one	  of	   these	  dimensions	   could	  pick	  out	  phenomena	   that	  would	  not	  
ordinarily	  be	  classed	  as	   ‘religious’.	  For	   instance,	   ‘Father	  Christmas’	   is	  a	  person	  who	  
manifestly	   transcends	  ordinary	  physical	   laws,	   yet	   few	  would	  describe	  belief	   in	   this	  
supernatural	  being	  as	  ‘religious’	  (Barrett,	  2008).	  Much	  the	  same	  could	  be	  said	  about	  
ritual,	  which	  is	  often	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  religious	  trait	  but	  is	  also	  prominent	  in	  non-­‐
religious	   (e.g.,	  military)	   settings	   (and,	   as	   Bloom,	   2012,	   notes,	   even	   ardent	   atheists	  
seek	  out	  transcendent	  experiences,	  whether	  through	  drugs	  or	  meditative	  practices).	  
Moreover,	   Saroglou	  himself	  points	  out	   that	   religious	  affiliation	   is	   just	  one	  of	  many	  
ways	  people	  can	  satisfy	  a	  need	  to	  ‘belong’.	  	  
	  
These	   considerations	   point	   to	   the	   arbitrariness	   of	   the	   ‘religion’	   designator.	  
Tendencies	  to	  postulate	  bodiless	  agents	  such	  as	  ghosts	  and	  gods	  and	  to	  participate	  
in	  rituals	  may	  seem	  to	  warrant	  some	  overarching	  label	  but	  in	  reality	  their	  cognitive	  
causes	   may	   be	   quite	   unrelated.	   For	   example,	   afterlife	   beliefs	   and	   rituals	   may	   be	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explicitly	   connected	   by	   more	   or	   less	   shared	   systems	   of	   meaning,	   expressed	   in	  
discourse	  at	  social	  events	  like	  funerals	  and	  wakes;	  and	  they	  may	  form	  part	  of	  larger	  
cultural	   systems	   that	   are	   transmitted	   across	   populations	   and	   handed	   down	   over	  
generations.	  But	  the	  psychological	  mechanisms	  that	  generate	  and	  underpin	  afterlife	  
beliefs	  may	  operate	  quite	   independently	   from	  those	   inducing	  us	   to	  perform	  rituals	  
(Boyer,	   2001;	   Whitehouse,	   2004).	   We	   should	   not,	   therefore,	   expect	   the	   different	  
component	  features	  of	  ‘religion’	  each	  to	  bear	  the	  same	  connection	  to	  morality.	  
	  
Moreover,	   according	   to	   a	   prevailing	   conception	   in	   moral	   psychology	   (see	   below),	  
morality	   –	   perhaps	   like	   religion	   –	   comprises	   a	   suite	   of	   largely	   independent	  
mechanisms	   that,	   although	   often	   connected	   by	   narratives,	   doctrines,	   songs,	   and	  
other	   culturally	   distributed	   networks	   of	   ideas,	   are	   the	   outcomes	   of	   quite	   distinct	  
psychological	   processes	   and	   functions.	   Thus,	   both	   religion	   and	   morality	   can	   be	  
endlessly	  assembled	  and	  reassembled	  in	  culturally	  and	  historically	  contingent	  ways.	  
Like	   the	   constellations	   of	   the	   astrologer’s	   imagination,	   these	   assemblages	   of	  
psychological	   and	   behavioural	   traits	   and	   tendencies	   may	   be	   artificial,	   contingent,	  
and	   arbitrary,	   rather	   than	   grounded	   in	   any	   stable	   underlying	   regularities	   (Boyer,	  
2001;	  Norenzayan,	  in	  press).	  
	  
One	  notable	  feature	  of	  Saroglou’s	  model	  of	  religious	  dimensions	  is	  that	  it	  categorizes	  
morality	  as	  a	  key	  dimension	  of	  religion:	  “Religion	  not	  only	   is	  particularly	  concerned	  
with	  morality	  as	  an	  external	  correlate	  but	  also	   includes	  morality	  as	  one	  of	   its	  basic	  
dimensions”	  (Saroglou,	  2011,	  p.	  1326).	  This	  stipulation	  implies	  that	  any	  inquiry	  into	  
the	   effects	   of	   ‘religion’	   as	   a	  whole	  on	   ‘morality’	   as	   a	  whole	  may	  be	   a	   circular	   and	  
therefore	  futile	  enterprise.	  
	  
Descriptive	  Ethnocentrism	  	  
If	  moral	   psychology	   is	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   psychology	   of	   religion,	   it	   will	   have	   to	   describe	   a	  moral	  
domain	  as	  expansive	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Gods.	  
	  
~	  Graham	  and	  Haidt	  (2010,	  p.	  143)	  
	  
[W]hen	  a	  newspaper	  headline	  reads	  BISHOP	  ATTACKS	  DECLINING	  MORAL	  STANDARDS,	  we	  expect	   to	   read	  yet	  
again	  about	  promiscuity,	  homosexuality,	  pornography,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  not	  about	   the	  puny	  amounts	  
we	  give	  as	  overseas	  aid	  to	  poorer	  nations,	  or	  our	  reckless	  indifference	  to	  the	  natural	  environment	  of	  
our	  planet.	  
	  
~	  Singer	  (2002,	  p.	  7)	  
	  
In	   a	   recent	   interview,	   the	  Hon.	  Rev.	   Fr.	   Simon	  Lokodo,	  Ugandan	  Minister	  of	   Ethics	  
and	   Integrity,	   indicated	   that	   he	   viewed	   the	   heterosexual	   rape	   of	   young	   girls	   as	  
preferable	  to	  consensual	  homosexuality:	  	  
	  
Lokodo:	  I	  say,	  let	  them	  do	  it	  but	  the	  right	  way.	  
Interviewer:	  Oh	  let	  them	  do	  it	  the	  right	  way?	  Let	  them	  rape	  children	  the	  right	  way?	  What	  are	  you	  
talking	  about?	  
Lokodo:	  No	  I	  am	  saying,	  at	  least	  it	  is	  [the]	  natural	  way	  of	  desiring	  sex.	  (O’Brien,	  2013)	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From	  a	  contemporary	  Western	  liberal	  perspective,	  there	  is	  a	  chilling	  irony	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	   Lokodo’s	   ministerial	   portfolio	   involves	   upholding	   moral	   values	   and	   principles	  
(see	  http://www.dei.go.ug).	  What	  could	  be	  more	  immoral	  than	  the	  rape	  of	  a	  child,	  a	  
manifestly	  harmful	  act?	  Is	  it	  conceivable	  that	  Lokodo’s	  opposition	  to	  homosexuality	  
is	  morally	  motivated?	  
	  
One	  obstacle	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  
and	   morality	   is	   the	   tendency	   of	   researchers	   to	   privilege	   their	   own	   cultural	  
perspective	   on	  what	   counts	   as	   a	   ‘moral	   concern’.	  Opposing	   such	   ethnocentrism	   is	  
not	  the	  same	  as	  advocating	  cultural	  or	  moral	  relativism:	  we	  need	  take	  no	  stand	  here	  
on	  whether	  absolute	  moral	  standards	  exist,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  citizens	  
of	   one	   society	   to	   judge	   the	   moral	   standards	   of	   another.	   Our	   concern	   is	   with	  
descriptive	   rather	   than	   prescriptive	   ethnocentrism.	   There	   are	   those	   who	   consider	  
appropriate	  sexual	  behaviour	  to	  be	  of	  paramount	  moral	  importance,	  and	  those,	  like	  
Peter	   Singer,	   who	   think	   there	   are	   more	   pressing	   moral	   concerns.	   Whatever	   our	  
ethical	  evaluations,	  however,	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  enquiry	  into	  the	  relationship	  between	  
religion	  and	  morality	  must	  expand	  the	  moral	  domain	  beyond	  the	  typical	  concerns	  of	  
individuals	   in	   WEIRD	   societies	   (Western,	   Educated,	   Industrialized,	   Rich,	   and	  
Democratic;	  Henrich,	  Heine	  &	  Norenzayan,	   2010),	   and	  must	   consider	   the	  effect	   of	  
religion	   on	   any	   domain	   that	   is	   accorded	   at	   least	   local	   moral	   significance.	   For	   our	  
purposes,	   therefore,	   a	   moral	   behaviour	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   behaviour	   that	   we	  
advocate,	  but	  a	  behaviour	  that	  is	  undertaken	  on	  putative	  moral	  grounds.	  
	  
We	   also	   view	   descriptive	   religious	   ethnocentrism	   as	   problematic.	   In	   our	   view,	   the	  
great	   variety	   of	   culturally	   distributed	   concepts	   and	   customs	   that	   garner	   the	   label	  
‘religion’	   are	   canalized	   and	   constrained	  by	   a	   finite	   yet	   disparate	   set	   of	   biologically	  
endowed	   cognitive	   predispositions	   (Baumard	  &	  Boyer,	   2013b;	   Xygalatas	  &	  McKay,	  
2013).	   As	   these	   predispositions	   constrain,	   rather	   than	   determine,	   the	   types	   of	  
religious	   systems	   that	   different	   cultures	   construct,	   there	   is	   enormous	   cultural	  
variability	  in	  their	  expression,	  with	  some	  traditions	  emphasising	  conformity	  of	  belief	  
(orthodoxy)	  over	  conformity	  of	  practice	  (orthopraxy)	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Laurin	  &	  Plaks,	  
2014;	   Purzycki	  &	   Sosis,	   2013)3.	   In	   short,	   the	   religious	   constellation	  may	   look	   quite	  
different	  from	  one	  cultural	  perspective	  than	  it	  does	  from	  another.	  This	  may	  help	  to	  
explain	   why	   ‘religion’	   has	   proven	   so	   notoriously	   difficult	   to	   define	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
merits	   scholarly	   consensus	   	   (Asad,	   1983;	   Saler,	   2000).	   To	   avoid	   this	   problem	   we	  
should	  resist	   the	  assumption	  that	  the	  core	  features	  of	   ‘religion’	   in	  our	  own	  culture	  
(the	   brightest	   stars	   in	   the	   constellation	   from	   one’s	   own	   cultural	   –	   or	   academic	   -­‐	  
standpoint)	  are	  the	  most	  important	  or	  valid.	  
	  
Sanitised	  Conceptions	  of	  Morality	  and	  Prosociality	  
[I]ngroup	  generosity	  and	  outgroup	  derogation	  actually	  represent	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin…	  
	  
                                                
3	  Cohen	   and	   colleagues	   (e.g.,	   Cohen,	   2003;	   Cohen	   &	   Rankin,	   2004;	   Cohen	   &	   Rozin,	   2001)	   have	  
investigated	   how	   different	   religious	   traditions	   vary	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   moral	   status	   accorded	   to	  
thoughts.	   Some	   religions	   (e.g.,	   Protestantism)	   view	   thoughts	   as	   morally	   equivalent	   to	   actions,	  
whereas	  others	  (e.g.,	  Judaism)	  don’t.	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~	  Shariff,	  Piazza	  and	  Kramer	  (2014,	  p.	  439)	  
	  
A	   frequent	   consequence	   of	   Western	   liberal	   ethnocentrism	   is	   a	   sanitised,	   “family-­‐
friendly”	  conception	  of	  morality.	  If	  Simon	  Lokodo’s	  ministerial	  portfolio	  seems	  ironic,	  
this	  may	  be	  because	  of	  a	  Western	  liberal	  tendency	  to	  equate	  morality	  with	  “warm,	  
fuzzy”	   virtues	   like	   kindness,	   gentleness,	   and	   nurturance;	   in	   short,	  with	   “niceness”.	  
Thus	  many	  scholars	  who	  write	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  morality	  
frame	   the	   key	   question	   as	   “Are	   religious	   people	   nice	   people?”	   (Morgan,	   1983)	   or	  
“Does	   religion	  make	   you	   nice?”	   (Bloom,	   2008;	   see	   also	  Malhotra,	   2008).	   In	  many	  
situations,	  however,	  what	  seems	  the	  “right”	  course	  of	  action	  may	  not	  be	  particularly	  
“nice”	  (e.g.,	   is	   it	  nice	   to	  punish	  criminals?);	  moreover,	   in	  certain	  cultures	  (e.g.,	  Nazi	  
Germany)	  “niceness”	  may	  even	  be	  cast	  as	  a	  vice	  rather	  than	  a	  virtue	  (Koonz,	  2003).	  
To	  identify	  morality	  with	  “niceness”	   is	  thus	  to	  ignore	  a	  plethora	  of	  moral	  concerns,	  
motivations	  and	  behaviours.	  
	  
To	  illustrate	  why	  such	  sanitizing	  is	  problematic	  scientifically,	  we	  note	  that	  the	  most	  
prominent	  contemporary	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  religion	  and	  morality	  is	  the	  
‘religious	   prosociality’	   hypothesis.	   Although	  many	  papers	   on	   ‘religious	   prosociality’	  
appear	   to	   equate	   the	   notions	   of	   morality	   and	   ‘prosociality’	   (e.g.,	   Norenzayan,	   in	  
press;	  Norenzayan	  &	  Shariff,	  2008;	  Preston,	  Ritter	  &	  Hernandez,	  2010),	  some	  imply	  
that	   morality	   is	   a	   subcategory	   of	   prosociality	   (e.g.,	   Galen,	   2012),	   while	   others	  
indicate	   that	   prosociality	   is	   a	   subcategory	   of	   morality	   (e.g.,	   Preston,	   Salomon	   &	  
Ritter,	  2014).	  In	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  however,	  prosociality	  is	  used	  to	  denote	  voluntary	  
behaviours	   that	   intentionally	   benefit	   others	   at	   personal	   cost	   (e.g.,	   helping,	  
comforting,	   sharing,	   donating,	   volunteering)	   –	   in	   other	   words,	   “nice”	   behaviours	  
(notwithstanding	   that	   the	   motivation	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   behaviours	   may	   be	   purely	  
egoistic;	   Saroglou,	   2013).	   While	   this	   usage	   reflects	   both	   popular	   parlance	   and	   a	  
venerable	  social	   scientific	   tradition	   (Batson	  and	  Powell,	  2003),	  we	  view	   it	  as	  highly	  
confusing.	  
	  
The	  problem	  is	  that	  behavior	  that	  benefits	  certain	  others	  (and	  so	  is	  “prosocial”	  in	  this	  
standard	   sense)	   may	   be	   detrimental	   to	   the	   wider	   social	   group.	   And	   conversely	  
behavior	   that	  benefits	   the	  group	  may	  be	  harmful	   to	  at	   least	  some	  of	   its	  members.	  
For	   example,	   torture	   is	   a	   powerful	   mechanism	   for	   enforcing	   and	   stabilizing	   social	  
norms,	  yet	  torture	  is	  often	  unambiguously	  detrimental	  to	  the	  recipient.	  The	  irony	  is	  
that	  behaviours	  that	  are	  literally	  “pro-­‐social”	  insofar	  as	  they	  further	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  
particular	   social	   group	   (e.g.,	   “prosocial	   aggression”:	   Sears,	   1961;	   “altruistic	  
punishment”:	   Fehr	   &	   Gaechter,	   2002;	   Shinada,	   Yamagishi	   &	   Ohmura,	   2004;	   cf.	  
Herrmann,	   Thoeni	   &	   Gaechter,	   2008)	   may	   be	   “antisocial”	   in	   the	   standard	   social	  
psychological	  usage	  (e.g.,	  by	  harming	  the	  norm	  violator).	  
	  
This	   is	  not	  even	   to	   consider	  behavior	   that	  extends	  across	  group	  boundaries.	   Some	  
personally	  costly	  acts	  are	   intended	  to	  benefit	  the	  ingroup	  by	  harming	  other	  groups	  
(Choi	   and	   Bowles,	   2007,	   refer	   to	   such	   behaviour	   as	   “parochial	   altruism”;	   see	   also	  
Bernhard,	   Fischbacher	   &	   Fehr,	   2006;	   Bowles,	   2009;	   De	   Dreu	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   If	  
attendance	  at	  religious	  services	  predicts	  support	  for	  suicide	  attacks	  (Ginges,	  Hansen	  
&	  Norenzayan,	  2009),	  is	  this	  evidence	  for	  “religious	  prosociality”,	  or	  evidence	  against	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it?	  In	  social	  psychological	  terms	  it	  is	  clearly	  the	  latter,	  but	  we	  regard	  this	  usage	  of	  the	  
term	  as	  unhelpfully	   sanitized.	  As	   the	   saying	   goes,	   ‘one	  man’s	   terrorist	   is	   another’s	  
freedom	  fighter’	  (Seymour,	  1975).	  In	  an	  otherwise	  highly	  illuminating	  recent	  article,	  
social	  psychologists	  Jesse	  Preston	  and	  Ryan	  Ritter	  referred	  to	  cooperation	  with	  both	  
ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  members	  as	  “prosociality”,	  while	  noting	  that	  helping	  outgroup	  
members	  can	  give	  that	  group	  a	  competitive	  advantage	   in	  survival	  and	  so	   indirectly	  
harm	   the	   ingroup.	   Here	   behavior	   that	   was	   explicitly	   acknowledged	   to	   harm	   the	  
ingroup	   was	   labeled	   “prosocial”	   (Preston	   &	   Ritter,	   2013).	   In	   a	   different	   example,	  
Blogowska,	   Lambert	   and	   Saroglou	   (2013)	   found	   that	   self-­‐reported	   religiosity	  
predicted	  helping	  of	  a	  needy	  in-­‐group	  member	  and	  also	  physical	  aggression	  towards	  
a	  member	  of	  a	  moral	  out-­‐group	  (a	  homosexual	  person).	  Blogowska	  et	  al.	  described	  
the	   latter	   behavior	   as	   “clearly	   and	   unambiguously”	   antisocial	   (2013,	   p.	   525).	   We	  
argue	   that	   this	   behavior	   can	   be	   reconstrued	   as	   (literally)	   prosocial	   –	   after	   all,	   if	  
homosexuality	   is	   a	   norm	   violation	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   religious	   group,	   then	  
behaviour	  that	  punishes	  this	  violation	  serves	  to	  enforce	  the	  norm	  and	  thus	  promotes	  
and	  protects	  the	  interests	  and	  values	  of	  the	  group.	  
	  
If	   the	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	   morality	   is	   to	   be	   explored	   within	   an	  
encompassing	   evolutionary	   framework	   (as	   we	   intend),	   the	   notion	   of	   prosociality	  
should	  assume	  a	  literal	  rather	  than	  sanitised	  meaning	  (i.e.,	  “furthering	  the	  interests	  
of	  the	  relevant	  social	  group”	  rather	  than	  “nice”)	  within	  an	  expansive	  moral	  domain.	  
As	   we	   will	   describe	   below,	   we	   advocate	   a	   strategy	   of	   scientific	   pluralism	   where	  
morality	  is	  concerned.	  In	  our	  view,	  sanitised	  prosociality	  (“caring”,	  or	  “niceness”)	  is	  a	  
core	  moral	  domain,	  but	  should	  not	  be	  solely	  identified	  with	  “morality”.	  
	  
Cognitive	  Versus	  Cultural	  Levels	  of	  Explanation	  	  
Efforts	   to	   characterise	   fully	   the	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	   morality	   are	  
limited	   by	   a	   tendency	   for	   researchers	   to	   conceptualize	   morality	   or	   religion	   as	  
bundles	   of	   either	   cognitively	   or	   culturally	   evolved	   traits	   rather	   than	   both.	   For	  
example,	   Bloom	   (2012)	   has	   attempted	   to	   refute	   the	   claim	   that	   morality	   requires	  
religion	   using	   evidence	   of	   (proto-­‐)moral	   behaviour	   in	   infant	   humans	   and	   in	   other	  
primates.	   This	   argument	   operationalizes	   morality	   at	   the	   level	   of	   evolved	  
psychological	  systems	  but	  operationalizes	  religion	  as	  a	  set	  of	  cultural	  notions.	  To	  the	  
extent	   that	   ‘religion’	   is	   assumed	   to	   refer	   to	   some	  cluster	  of	   features	   that	  must	  be	  
culturally	   learned	   this	   argument	  may	   have	   something	   to	   commend	   it	   but	   at	   least	  
some	  of	   the	   psychological	   states	   that	   Bloom	   considers	   religious	   (e.g.,	   ‘spirituality’)	  
are	  rooted	  in	  very	  early	  emerging	  cognitive	  capacities	  (Barrett,	  2012).	  So	  in	  principle	  
it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	   investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  at	   least	  some	  aspects	  
(or	   ‘building	   blocks’)	   of	   religion	   and	   morality	   in	   infancy	   and	   perhaps	   also	   in	  
nonhuman	  primates.	  
	  
One	   way	   of	   avoiding	   this	   problem	   is	   to	   disambiguate	   epigenetic,	   cognitive-­‐
developmental,	   and	   social-­‐historical	   processes	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   religious	   and	  
moral	  traits	  (Whitehouse,	  2013).	  For	  example,	  a	  capacity	  to	  empathise	  with	  the	  pain	  
of	  others	  may	  be	  genetically	  canalized	  in	  the	  development	  of	  infant	  neural	  structures	  
but	  environmental	  cues	  also	  shape	  the	  organization	  of	  neural	  networks	  and	  even	  the	  
gross	  morphology	  of	   the	  brain.	  The	   interaction	  of	  genetic	  and	  epigenetic	   factors	   in	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the	   maturation	   of	   empathizing	   capacities	   may	   follow	   different	   developmental	  
pathways	  in	  different	  individuals,	  resulting	  in	  quite	  different	  outcomes	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  patterns	  in	  adulthood.	  At	  a	  still	  higher	  level	  of	  complexity	  
the	  environment	  in	  which	  brains	  and	  cognitive	  systems	  develop	  is	  itself	  canalized	  by	  
social	  structures	  comprising	  culturally	  distributed	  rules	  and	  algorithms	  for	  ‘proper’	  or	  
‘normal’	   behaviour	   in	   given	   social	   settings,	   counterbalanced	   by	   population-­‐level	  
decision-­‐making	   on	   the	   ground	   that	  may	   deviate	   from	   tradition	   and	   consequently	  
update	  its	  edicts.	  Processes	  at	  all	  these	  levels	  contribute	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  targets	  of	  
empathy	  in	  society,	   influencing	  people’s	  willingness	  to	  tolerate	  harming	  behaviours	  
such	  as	  warfare,	  enslavement,	  capital	  punishment,	  and	  torture	  and	  calibrating	  what	  
counts	  as	  justice	  or	  wanton	  cruelty.	  The	  same	  principles	  apply	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
religious	  traits.	  For	  example,	  a	  genetically	  canalized	  tendency	  to	  process	  information	  
about	   mental	   and	   mechanical	   events	   via	   quite	   different	   neural	   structures	   may	  
undergird	   the	   cognitive	   developmental	   pathways	   for	   mind-­‐body	   dualism	   (Bloom,	  
2004)	   but	   this	   tendency	   is	   also	   shaped	   and	   constrained	   by	   cultural	   concepts	   and	  
their	   histories.	   When	   asking	   (for	   example)	   how	   notions	   of	   bodiless	   agents	   might	  
impact	   the	   development	   of	   empathy	  we	   need	   to	   specify	   the	   level(s)	   at	  which	   the	  
impact	  is	  hypothesized	  to	  occur	  and	  trace	  its	  repercussions	  at	  all	  levels	  on	  both	  sides	  
of	  the	  religion-­‐morality	  equation.	  
	  
Religion	  and	  Morality:	  A	  New	  Approach	  
	  
In	  order	   to	   circumvent	   the	   limitations	  and	  avoid	   the	  problems	  enumerated	  above,	  
we	   propose	   a	   new	   approach	   to	   the	   religion-­‐morality	   debate	   that	   not	   only	  
fractionates	   both	   religion	   and	   morality	   but	   is	   careful	   to	   distinguish	   the	   different	  
levels	  at	  which	  explanation	   is	  required.	  This	  will	  provide	  the	  basis	   for	  more	  precise	  
questions	  about	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   fractionated	   components	  of	   religion	  
and	  morality	  respectively.	  	  
	  
A	   comprehensive	   explanation	   in	   evolutionary	   terms	   of	   any	   causal	   relationships	  
between	   our	   fractionated	   components	   of	   the	   categories	   'religion'	   and	   'morality'	  
would	   need	   to	   attend	   to	   four	   main	   types	   of	   questions,	   commonly	   known	   as	  
Tinbergen's	  Four	  Whys:	  a	  causal	  why,	  concerning	  the	  psychological	  mechanisms	  that	  
produce	   a	   particular	   causal	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	   morality;	   a	  
developmental	  why,	  concerning	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  relationship	  emerges	  in	  
the	  growth	  and	  maturation	  of	  individuals;	  a	  functional	  why,	  concerning	  the	  adaptive	  
value	   of	   the	   relationship	   in	   comparison	   with	   others;	   and	   an	   historical	   why,	  
concerning	   the	   phylogeny	   of	   the	   relationship,	   its	   appearance	   via	   a	   succession	   of	  
preceding	  forms	  (cf.	  Tinbergen,	  1963).4	  Evolutionary	  theorists	  standardly	  categorize	  
the	   causal	   and	   developmental	   whys	   as	   forms	   of	   ‘proximate’	   explanation	   and	   the	  
functional	   and	   phylogenetic	   whys	   as	   forms	   of	   ‘ultimate’	   explanation	   (see	   Mayr,	  
                                                
4	  Although	  Tinbergen	  apparently	  did	  not	  mention	  Aristotle	   in	  his	  work	   (Hladký	  &	  Havlíček,	   2013),	   a	  
number	  of	  authors	  have	  commented	  on	  the	  parallels	  between	  Tinbergen’s	  Four	  Whys	  and	  Aristotle’s	  
teaching	   of	   Four	   Causes	   (e.g.,	   Barrett,	   Blumstein,	   Clutton-­‐Brock	   &	   Kappeler,	   2013).	   The	   point	   that	  
scientific	   research	   on	   religion	   should	   consider	   all	   four	   whys	   has	   been	   eloquently	   made	   by	   Hinde	  
(2005)	  and	  informs	  his	  writings	  on	  religion	  more	  generally	  (e.g.,	  Hinde,	  1999).	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1961).	   In	   this	   context,	   ‘ultimate’	  does	  not	  mean	   final	  or	   superior	  but	   refers	   to	   the	  
evolutionary	   forces	   that	   sustain	   the	   psychological	   or	   physiological	   mechanisms	   in	  
question.	   Thus,	   if	   the	   pigmentation	   of	   butterfly	  wings	   in	   industrial	   areas	   becomes	  
darker	   over	   successive	   generations	   (Haldane,	   1927)	   it	   is	   because	   darker	   variants	  
have	   a	   selective	   advantage	   in	   smoke-­‐stained	   environments,	   but	   that	   does	   not	  
dispense	  with	  the	  need	  to	  explain	  the	  physiological	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  individual	  
butterfly	  wings	  acquire	  their	  coloration,	  darkness,	  and	  hue.	  
	  
Tinbergen’s	  four	  whys	  have	  been	  illustrated	  concisely	  using	  the	  structural	  properties	  
of	  the	  human	  hand:	  	  
	  
[I]n	  answering	   the	  question	   ‘Why	  does	   the	  human	   thumb	  move	  differently	   from	  the	  other	  
fingers?’	   the	   answer	   might	   be	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   differences	   in	   skeletal	   arrangements	   and	  
muscle	  attachments	  (a	  causal	  answer);	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  embryology	  of	  the	  hand,	  and	  how	  
the	   finger	   rudiments	   grew	  out	   (developmental);	   or	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   utility	   of	   an	   opposable	  
thumb	  for	  holding	  things	  (functional);	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  descent	  from	  monkey-­‐like	  ancestors	  
which	  had	  opposable	  thumbs	  (evolutionary).	  These	  answers	  are	  all	  correct,	  but	  together	  they	  
provide	  fuller	  understanding.	  (Hinde,	  2005,	  p.	  39).	  
	  
In	   considering	   human	   traits,	   however,	   the	   situation	   is	   often	   complicated	   by	   the	  
extent	   and	   variability	   of	   cultural	   overlays.	   In	   some	   cases,	   these	   are	   quite	   literally	  
overlays	   –	   for	   example,	   in	   cold	   environments	   human	   hands	   may	   be	   overlaid	   by	  
clothing,	  such	  as	  gloves	  or	  mittens.	  
	  
Our	  general	  theoretical	  approach	  melds	  recent	  theorizing	  in	  disciplines	  such	  as	  moral	  
psychology	   and	   the	   cognitive	   science	   of	   religion.	   According	   to	   this	   approach,	  
religious	   and	   moral	   cultural	   representations	   are	   triggered	   and	   constrained	   by	  
implicit,	  intuitive	  cognitive	  systems	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  morphologies	  of	  
human	  hands	  and	   feet	   shape	  and	   constrain	   the	  morphologies	  of	   gloves	   and	   shoes	  
(see	   Figure	   2).	   To	   become	   culturally	   widespread,	   shoes	   must	   fit	   the	   basic	  
morphology	   of	   human	   feet,	   while	   also	   satisfying	   other	   biologically	   endowed	  
preferences	   (e.g.,	   preferences	   for	   comfort	   and/or	   gait;	  Morris,	  White,	  Morrison	  &	  
Fisher,	   2013).	   Similarly,	   successful	   religious	   and	   moral	   cultural	   representations	   –	  
including	   notions	   of	   supernatural	   agents	   and	   realms,	   ritual	   practices,	   and	   various	  
behavioural	  prescriptions	  and	  proscriptions	  	  -­‐	  must	  resonate	  with	  (“fit”)	  biologically	  
endowed	   cognitive	   structures	   and	   preferences	   (or	   clash	   with	   them	   in	   attention-­‐
grabbing	   and	   memorable	   ways;	   see	   below).	   But	   such	   structures	   may	   in	   turn	   be	  
subject	   –	   given	   sufficient	   time-­‐scales	   -­‐	   to	   genetic	  modification	  under	   the	   selection	  
pressures	   imposed	   by	   culturally	   evolved	   practices	   and	   preferences.	   A	   cultural	  
preference	  for	  small	  feet	  in	  women	  may	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  females	  with	  such	  
feet	   are	   chosen	   as	   sexual	   partners	   or	   less	   likely	   that	   they	   become	   victims	   of	  
infanticide	  (Newson,	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2007).	  So	  just	  as	  shoes	  adapt	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  
biologically	   endowed	   feet,	   so	   feet	  may	   need	   to	   adapt	   to	   fit	   cultural	   prescriptions.	  
And	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  certain	  universal	  features	  of	  our	  biologically	  evolved	  cognitive	  
architecture	   and	   our	   culturally	   evolved	   religious	   and	   moral	   representations	   may	  
result	  from	  complex	  processes	  of	  co-­‐evolution.	  At	  the	  risk	  of	  mixing	  metaphors,	  our	  
minds	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   “fertile	   ground”	   for	   certain	   cultural	   representations,	  
“seeds”	  which	  “take	  root	  in	  individual	  human	  beings…	  and	  get	  those	  human	  beings	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to	   spread	   them,	   far	   and	   wide”	   (Dennett,	   2006,	   p.	   2).	   To	   analyze	   these	   various	  
processes	   correctly,	   however,	   it	   is	   vital	   that	   we	   disambiguate	   at	   which	   levels	  








Given	  this	  complex	  interplay	  between	  sets	  of	  evolved	  cognitive	  systems	  and	  cultural	  
elements	  (some	  of	  which	  may	  be	  arbitrarily	  designated	  ‘religion’	  and	  some	  arbitrarily	  
designated	   ‘morality’),	   what	   can	   it	   mean	   to	   investigate	   the	   relationship	   between	  
religion	  and	  morality?	   In	  what	   follows	  we	  begin	  by	   fractionating	   first	  morality	   and	  
then	   religion	   into	   elements	   that	   are	   thought	   to	   be	   recurrent	   features	   of	   human	  
evolved	   psychology.	  We	   then	   consider	   whether	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   any	   of	   the	  
fractionated	   elements	   of	   religion	   have	   a	   biologically	   evolved	   connection	   to	   the	  
fractionated	  elements	  of	  morality.	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  scant	  evidence	  for	  this	  
at	   present.	   We	   then	   consider	   the	   cultural	   evolution	   of	   the	   religion-­‐morality	  
relationship.	   Here	   we	   argue	   that	   cultural	   evolution	   has	   served	   to	   connect	   the	  
fractionated	  elements	  of	  religion	  and	  morality	  in	  a	  cascading	  myriad	  of	  ways	  and	  it	  is	  
at	   this	   level	   primarily	   that	   the	   religion-­‐morality	   debate	   might	   be	   most	   fruitfully	  
focused	  in	  future.	  
	  
Fractionating	  Morality:	  Moral	  Foundations	  
	  
For	   the	   purposes	   of	   fractionating	   morality	   we	   import	   what	   we	   regard	   as	   the	  
dominant	   model	   in	   contemporary	   moral	   psychology:	   Moral	   Foundations	   Theory	  
(MFT;	  Graham	  &	  Haidt,	   2010;	  Graham	  et	   al.,	   2013;	  Graham,	  Haidt	  &	  Nosek,	  2009;	  
Haidt,	  2012;	  Haidt	  &	  Graham,	  2007,	  2009;	  Haidt	  &	   Joseph,	  2004,	  2007).	  MFT	   is	  an	  
avowedly	   pluralistic	   theory	   of	   morality.	   Whereas	   some	   prominent	   theorists	   have	  
favoured	  a	  “monistic”	  conception	  of	  morality,	  whereby	  all	  moral	  norms	  reduce	  to	  a	  
single	  basic	  moral	  concern	  such	  as	  care	  or	  justice	  (e.g.,	  Gray,	  Young	  &	  Waytz,	  2012;	  
Kohlberg,	  1971),	  others	  (e.g.,	  Berlin,	  2013;	  Gilligan,	  1982)	  have	  argued	  there	  are	  two	  
or	  more	   fundamental,	   mutually	   incompatible	   and	   incommensurable	  moral	   values.	  
MFT	   falls	   within	   the	   latter	   tradition,	   proposing	   that	   the	   rich	   array	   of	   culturally	  
constructed	  moral	  norms	  and	   institutions	  are	   triggered	  and	  constrained	  by	   several	  
universal	  and	  innate	  psychological	  systems,	  the	  eponymous	  moral	  foundations.	  
	  
Moral	  foundations	  theorists	  have	  highlighted	  five	  core	  foundations,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  
following	   pan-­‐human	   principles:	   1)	   Care/harm:	   harming	   others	   is	   wrong	   whereas	  
treating	  others	  with	  kindness	  and	  compassion	   is	  right;	  2)	  Fairness/cheating:	  people	  
should	   reap	   what	   they	   sow	   and	   not	   take	   more	   than	   they	   deserve;	   3)	   Ingroup	  
loyalty/betrayal:	  what	   is	  good	   for	   the	  community	  comes	  above	  selfish	   interests;	  4)	  
Respect	   for	   authority/subversion:	   we	   should	   defer	   to	   our	   elders	   and	   betters	   and	  
respect	   tradition;	   and	   5)	   Purity/degradation:	   the	   body	   is	   a	   temple	   and	   can	   be	  
desecrated	  by	  immoral	  actions	  and	  contaminants.	  
  13 
	  
Moral	   foundations	   theorists	   claim	   that	   each	  of	   these	   principles	   is	  written	   into	   our	  
distinctively	  human	  nature,	  arising	   from	  the	  normal	  operation	  of	  evolved	  cognitive	  
mechanisms.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   moral	   foundations	   are	   conceived	   as	  
constraining,	   rather	   than	   determining,	   the	   types	   of	   moral	   systems	   that	   humans	  
construct.	  One	  of	   the	  major	   contributions	  of	   the	  Moral	   Foundations	   approach	  has	  
been	   to	   highlight	   the	   cultural	   and	   political	   variability	   in	   the	   expression	   of	   these	  
foundations.	   Some	   cultures	   construct	   their	   moral	   norms	   and	   institutions	   on	   a	  
comparatively	  small	  subset	  of	  foundations.5	  For	  example,	  whereas	  the	  moral	  orders	  
of	  most	  traditional	  societies	  are	  broad,	  the	  moral	  domain	  in	  WEIRD	  cultures	  (Henrich	  
et	  al.,	  2010)	  is	  built	  largely	  on	  the	  first	  two	  (‘individualising’)	  foundations,	  focusing	  on	  
the	   protection	   of	   individuals	   from	   harm	   and	   exploitation	   (Graham	   et	   al.,	   2013).	  
Meanwhile,	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   have	   found	   that	   political	   liberals	   value	   the	  
individualizing	   principles	   of	   Care	   and	   Fairness	   more	   than	   conservatives,	   whereas	  
conservatives	  value	  the	  ‘binding’	  principles	  of	  Loyalty,	  Authority,	  and	  Sanctity	  more	  
than	  liberals	  (e.g.,	  Graham	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Graham,	  Nosek	  &	  Haidt,	  2012).	  
	  
Although	  MFT	   is	   not	  without	   its	   critics,	   we	   regard	   it	   as	   the	  most	   fully	   developed,	  
integrative	  and	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  morality	  currently	  available.	  Much	  criticism	  
to	  date	  has	  focused	  on	  MFT’s	  pluralism	  (Graham	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Some	  critics	  (monists)	  
dispute	  pluralism	  per	  se.	  For	  example,	  Gray	  et	  al.	   (2012)	  have	  argued	  that	  concern	  
about	   interpersonal	   harm	   is	   the	   distilled	   essence	   of	   morality,	   and	   thus	   that	  
care/harm	  is	   the	  one	  true	  moral	   foundation.	  Many	  moral	   judgments,	  however,	  are	  
difficult	   to	   understand	   “through	   the	   lens	   of	   intention	   and	   suffering”	   (Gray	   et	   al.,	  
2012,	   p.	   103).	   Consider	   Simon	   Lokodo’s	   judgment	   that	   homosexuality	   is	   immoral.	  
Many	  have	  argued	  that	  homosexuality	  is	  harmful,	  for	  instance	  harmful	  to	  families	  or	  
to	   society	   more	   generally	   (e.g.,	   Bryant,	   1977).	   But	   Gray	   et	   al’s	   dyadic	   model	   of	  
morality	   explicitly	   predicts	   greater	   concern	   for	   immoral	   acts	   that	   cause	   direct	  
suffering	   than	   those	   that	   do	  not.	   Few	   could	  doubt	   that	   the	   rape	  of	   a	   child	   causes	  
more	   “direct	   suffering”	   than	   private	   consensual	   sex	   between	   same-­‐sex	   partners.	  
Whereas	  Gray	  et	  al’s	  monistic	  perspective	  has	  to	  shoehorn	  all	  moral	  judgments	  into	  
the	  same	  category,	  MFT’s	  pluralism	  enables	  concern	  for	  rape	  victims	  and	  opposition	  
to	  homosexuality	   to	  be	   viewed	  as	   the	  expression	  of	  different	  moral	   foundations	  –	  
the	   former	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   “care”	   foundation	   and	   the	   latter	   founded	  
in	  ”binding”	  concerns	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  group	  and	  perhaps	  for	  bodily	  purity.	  
	  
To	   cite	   another	   topical	   example,	   the	   social	   media	   service	   Facebook	   recently	  
attracted	   criticism	   for	   allowing	   users	   to	   post	   graphic	   footage	   of	   beheadings	  while	  
prohibiting	   photos	   of	   videos	   containing	   nudity	   (including	   images	   of	   breastfeeding	  
where	  the	  baby	  does	  not	  totally	  obscure	  the	  nipple	  or	  where	  the	  non-­‐nursing	  breast	  
is	  in	  view;	  see	  Clark,	  2013).	  Given	  the	  amnesty	  for	  posting	  images	  of	  violent	  murder,	  
it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   the	   proscription	   on	   breastfeeding	   images	   “through	   the	   lens	   of	  
interpersonal	   harm”	   (Gray	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   p.	   110).	   A	   final	   example	   concerns	   moral	  
                                                
5 	  An	   advantage	   of	   our	   hand/glove	   analogy	   over	   the	   foundation/building	   analogy	   is	   that	   the	  
morphologies	  of	  hands	  suggest	  gloves	  more	  than	  the	  morphologies	  of	  foundations	  suggest	  resulting	  
architectural	  forms.	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judgments	  of	  suicide,	  the	  self-­‐directed	  nature	  of	  which	  poses	  an	  apparent	  problem	  
for	   Gray	   et	   al’s	   dyadic	   model.	   One	   might	   argue	   that	   people	   who	   commit	   suicide	  
harm	  others	  (e.g.,	  loved	  ones)	  as	  well	  as	  themselves,	  and	  that	  the	  harm	  to	  others	  is	  
the	  source	  of	  disapprobation	  where	  suicide	   is	   concerned.	  However,	  a	   recent	   study	  
by	  Rottman,	  Kelemen	  and	  Young	  (2014)	  casts	  doubt	  on	  this	  explanation.	  Participants	  
read	   a	   series	   of	   fictitious	   (but	   ostensibly	   real)	   obituaries	   describing	   suicide	   or	  
homicide	  victims,	  and	  made	  a	  series	  of	  ratings	  (including	  rating	  the	  moral	  wrongness	  
of	   each	   death).	   Whereas	   perceived	   harm	   was	   the	   only	   variable	   predicting	   moral	  
judgments	   of	   homicide,	   feelings	   of	   disgust	   and	   purity	   concerns	   –	   but	   not	   harm	  
ratings	  –	  predicted	  moral	  condemnations	  of	  suicide.	  Thus	  -­‐	  contrary	  to	  participants’	  
explicit	  beliefs	  about	  their	  own	  moral	   judgments	   -­‐	  suicide	  was	  deemed	   immoral	   to	  
the	  extent	  that	  it	  was	  considered	  impure.	  
	  
Other	  critics	  of	  MFT’s	  pluralism	  have	  not	  questioned	  the	  idea	  of	  pluralism	  per	  se,	  but	  
have	  objected	  to	  MFT’s	  particular	  brand	  of	  pluralism.	  However,	  proponents	  of	  MFT	  
do	  not	  claim	  that	  their	  list	  of	  five	  foundations	  is	  exhaustive,	  but	  have	  actively	  sought	  
out	   arguments	   and	   evidence	   for	   others	   (e.g.,	   research	   is	   currently	   underway	   to	  
evaluate	   the	   additional	   candidates	   of	   liberty/oppression,	   efficiency/waste,	   and	  
ownership/theft;	   Graham	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Iyer,	   Koleva,	   Graham,	  Ditto	  &	  Haidt,	   2012).	  
Moral	  foundations	  theorists	  have	  put	  forward	  their	  own	  celestial	  analogy	  to	  describe	  
the	  process	  of	  identifying	  foundations:	  
	  
There	  are	  millions	  of	  objects	  orbiting	  the	  sun,	  but	  astronomers	  do	  not	  call	  them	  all	  planets.	  
There	   are	   six	   (including	   the	   Earth)	   that	   are	   so	   visible	   that	   they	  were	   recorded	   in	  multiple	  
ancient	  civilizations,	  and	  then	  there	  are	  a	  bunch	  of	  objects	  further	  out	  that	  were	  discovered	  
with	   telescopes.	   Astronomers	   disagreed	   for	   a	   while	   as	   to	   whether	   Pluto	   and	   some	   more	  
distant	   icy	  bodies	  should	  be	  considered	  planets.	  Similarly,	  we	  are	  content	  to	  say	  that	  there	  
are	  many	  aspects	  of	  human	  nature	  that	  contribute	  to	  and	  constrain	  moral	  judgment,	  and	  our	  
task	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  most	  important	  ones…	  (Graham	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  pp.	  104-­‐5)	  
	  
Using	   the	   fairness	   foundation	   for	   illustration,	   Graham	   et	   al.	   (2013)	   provide	   five	  
criteria	   that	   any	   “aspect	   of	   human	   nature”	   must	   satisfy	   to	   qualify	   as	   a	   moral	  
foundation.	   First,	   the	   relevant	  moral	   concern	  must	   feature	   regularly	   in	   third-­‐party	  
normative	   judgments,	  wherein	  people	  express	  condemnation	   for	  actions	   that	  have	  
no	  direct	   consequences	   for	   them.	  Fairness	   certainly	   satisfies	   this	   requirement	  –	  as	  
Graham	   and	   colleagues	   note,	   gossip	   about	   group	   members	   who	   violate	   fairness	  
norms	  (e.g.,	  who	  cheat,	   free	  ride	  or	  neglect	   to	  reciprocate)	   is	  ubiquitous	   in	  human	  
groups,	   with	   some	   authors	   even	   suggesting	   that	   gossip	   between	   third	   parties	  
evolved	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  detecting	  and	  dissuading	  cheating	  and	  free	  riding	  (e.g.,	  
see	   Ingram,	   Piazza	   &	   Bering,	   2009).	   Second,	   violations	   of	   the	   moral	   principle	   in	  
question	   must	   elicit	   rapid,	   automatic,	   affectively	   valenced	   evaluations.	   LoBue,	  
Chiong,	  Nishida,	  DeLoache	  and	  Haidt	   (2011)	   found	   that	   children	  as	  young	  as	   three	  
years	   old	   reacted	   rapidly	   and	   negatively	   to	   unequal	   distributions	   of	   stickers,	  
particularly	  personally	  disadvantageous	  distributions.	  
For	  Graham	  et	  al.,	  these	  two	  criteria	  establish	  the	  “moral”	  quality	  of	  the	  foundations.	  
Their	   last	   three	   criteria	   relate	   to	   foundationhood	  per	   se.	   First,	   foundational	  moral	  
concerns	   should	   be	   culturally	   widespread.	   In	   terms	   of	   fairness,	   a	   preference	   for	  
interactions	   based	   on	   proportionality	   is	   certainly	   widespread	   (Baumard	   &	   Boyer,	  
  15 
2013a;	   Gurven,	   2004),	   and	   people	   from	   a	   diversity	   of	   cultures	   appear	   more	  
interested	  in	  relative	  than	  absolute	  benefits	  (Brosnan	  &	  de	  Waal,	  2005;	  Henrich	  et	  al.,	  
2005).	  According	  to	  Graham	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  a	  society	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  identified	  in	  which	  
reciprocity	  is	  not	  a	  prominent	  moral	  concern.	  Second,	  there	  should	  be	  indicators	  of	  
innate	  preparedness	  for	  foundational	  concerns.	  Evidence	  that	  capuchin	  monkeys	  will	  
sometimes	   forgo	   a	   food	   reward	   delivered	   by	   an	   experimenter	  who	   has	   previously	  
paid	  another	  monkey	  a	  more	  attractive	  reward	  for	  equal	  effort	  (Brosnan	  &	  de	  Waal,	  
2003)	  suggests	  that	  fairness	  concerns	  are	  found	  in	  at	  least	  some	  nonhuman	  primates.	  
Moreover,	  developmental	  studies	  show	  that	  young	  infants	  are	  sensitive	  to	  inequity.	  
For	   example,	   Sloane,	   Baillargeon	   and	   Premack	   (2012)	   found	   that	   21-­‐month-­‐old	  
children	  expected	  an	  experimenter	  to	  reward	  each	  of	  two	  individuals	  when	  both	  had	  
worked	  at	   an	   assigned	   task,	   but	  not	  when	  one	  of	   the	   individuals	   had	  done	  all	   the	  
work.	  Baumard,	  Mascaro	  and	  Chevallier	  (2011)	  found	  that	  3-­‐	  and	  4-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  
were	  able	   to	   take	  merit	   into	  account	  by	  distributing	   tokens	  according	   to	   individual	  
contributions.	  
Finally,	   an	   evolutionary	   model	   should	   clearly	   specify	   the	   adaptive	   advantage	  
conferred	  by	  the	  candidate	  foundation	  upon	  individuals	  who	  bore	  it	  in	  the	  ancestral	  
past	   (as	   Graham	   et	   al.,	   2013,	   note,	   a	   good	   evolutionary	   theory	   will	   not	   invoke	  
biological	   group	   selection	   without	   adducing	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   additional	   support).	  
Fairness	   meets	   this	   criterion	   nicely.	   For	   example,	   Baumard,	   Andre	  ́	   and	   Sperber	  
(2013)	   have	   compellingly	   argued	   that	   fairness	   preferences	   are	   adapted	   to	   an	  
environment	   in	   which	   individuals	   competed	   to	   be	   selected	   and	   recruited	   for	  
mutually	  advantageous	  cooperative	  interactions	  (see	  also	  Trivers,	  1971).	  
Fractionating	  Religion:	  Religious	  Foundations?	  
Just	  as	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  decompose	  the	  category	  ‘morality’	  into	  a	  set	  of	  theoretically	  
grounded	  elements,	  so	   ‘religion’	  can	  be	  fractionated	   into	  distinct	  components	  with	  
stable	  cognitive	  underpinnings.	  Research	  in	  the	  ‘cognitive	  science	  of	  religion’	  has	  not	  
sought	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   universality	   of	   any	   particular	   religious	   representations,	  
such	   as	   various	  notions	  of	   ancestors,	   punitive	  deities,	   creator	  beings,	   or	   sacrifices,	  
blessings,	   and	   rites	   of	   passage.	   Rather,	   the	   aim	   has	   been	   to	   show	   that	   the	   great	  
variety	   of	   culturally	   distributed	   dogmas	   and	   practices	   that	   have	   been	   collectively	  
labelled	  ‘religion’	  are	  shaped	  and	  constrained	  by	  a	  finite	  but	  disparate	  set	  of	  evolved	  
cognitive	   predispositions	   –	   what	   we	   might	   call	   “religious	   foundations”.	   These	  
foundations	   comprise	   a	   set	   of	   evolved	   domain-­‐specific	   systems,	   together	  with	   the	  
intuitions	   and	   predispositions	   that	   those	   systems	   instill	   (see	   Baumard	   &	   Boyer,	  
2013b;	   and	   Figure	   2).	   Barring	   pathology	   –	   itself	   a	   valuable	   source	   of	   insight	   into	  
natural	  cognition	  (Coltheart,	  1984;	  Ellis	  &	  Young,	  1988)	  -­‐	  such	  tendencies	  emerge	  in	  
all	  human	  beings	  without	  the	  need	  for	  deliberate	  instruction	  or	  training,	  even	  if	  their	  
expression	   in	   development	   may	   be	   ‘tuned’	   by	   cultural	   environments	   (McCauley,	  
2011).	  
Although	   Saroglou	   (2011)	   provides	   a	   valuable	   synthesis	   of	   previous	   taxonomies	   of	  
core	   religious	   dimensions,	   in	   our	   view	   the	   dimensions	   he	   settles	   on	   (Believing,	  
Bonding,	  Behaving,	  Belonging)	  do	  not	  correspond	  well	  to	  evolved	  cognitive	  systems,	  
so	   are	   not	   good	   candidates	   for	   religious	   foundations.	   For	   example,	   Saroglou’s	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‘believing’	   dimension	   encompasses	   belief	   in	   “divine	   beings”	   and	   belief	   in	  
“impersonal	   forces	   or	   principles”	   (p.	   1323).	   There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   important	   and	  
potentially	   dissociable	   supernatural	   concepts	   here:	   the	   notion	   of	   supernatural	  
agency,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  (e.g.,	  Gods,	  spirits,	  angels,	  “ancestors”),	  and	  the	  notion	  that	  
our	  actions	  in	  this	  life	  have	  proportionate	  (Baumard	  &	  Boyer,	  2013a),	  supernaturally	  
mediated	   consequences,	   on	   the	   other.	   These	   consequences	   may	   be	   mediated	   by	  
supernatural	  agents,	  as	  when	  gods	  bestow	  rewards	  or	  dispense	  punishments	  in	  this	  
life	   or	   the	   next;	   but	   they	   may	   also	   reflect	   the	   impersonal	   unfolding	   of	   a	   cosmic	  
principle	   (e.g.,	  Saṃsāra).	  Moreover,	   supernatural	   agents	  are	  not	  necessarily	   in	   the	  
business	  of	  attending	  to	  our	  behaviours	  and	  implementing	  relevant	  consequences	  -­‐	  
as	  we	  review	  below,	  gods	  vary	   in	  their	  concerns	  with	  human	  affairs	   in	  general	  and	  
with	   moral	   issues	   more	   specifically.	   In	   view	   of	   these	   various	   considerations,	   one	  
could	   posit	   not	   one	   but	   two	   distinct	   dimensions	   of	   supernatural	   belief	   here:	   1)	  
Supernatural	   agency	   and	   2)	   Supernatural	   justice.	   Rather	   than	   take	   this	   route,	   our	  
preference	  is	  to	  specify	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  evolved	  cognitive	  systems	  that,	  jointly	  or	  in	  
isolation,	   would	   account	   for	   why	   these	   dimensions	   are	   cross-­‐culturally	   and	  
historically	  recurrent.	  
	  
Here	   we	   discuss	   five	   strong	   candidates	   for	   religious	   foundationhood:	   1)	   a	   system	  
specialized	   for	   the	   detection	   of	   agents;	   2)	   a	   system	   devoted	   to	   representing,	  
inferring	  and	  predicting	  the	  mental	  states	  of	   intentional	  agents;	  3)	  a	  system	  geared	  
towards	  producing	   teleofunctional	  explanations	  of	  objects	  and	  events;	  4)	  a	   system	  
specialised	  for	  affiliating	  with	  groups	  through	  the	  imitation	  of	  causally	  opaque	  action	  
sequences;	   and	   5)	   a	   system	   specialised	   for	   the	   detection	   of	   genetic	   kinship.	   Like	  
proponents	  of	  MFT,	  we	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  this	  list	  is	  exhaustive,	  and	  future	  research	  
may	   suggest	   alternative,	   or	   additional,	   candidates	   (where	   relevant	   we	   discuss	  
current	   alternate	   views	   below).	  Our	   commitment,	   born	   of	   doubt	   that	   there	   is	   any	  
“distilled	  essence”	  of	  religion	  (Gray	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  is	  primarily	  to	  a	  pluralistic	  approach.	  
Nevertheless,	   based	   on	   an	   extensive	   review	   of	   the	   cognitive	   science	   of	   religion	  
literature	   the	   following	   represent	   the	   most	   plausible	   candidates	   for	   universal	  
religious	  foundations,	  on	  current	  evidence.	  
	  
Hyperactive	  Agency	  Detection	  
According	   to	   error	   management	   theory	   (Haselton,	   2003;	   Haselton	   &	   Buss,	   2000;	  
Haselton	   &	   Nettle,	   2006;	   Johnson,	   Blumstein,	   Fowler	   &	   Haselton,	   2013;	  McKay	   &	  
Efferson,	  2010),	  in	  any	  domain	  characterized	  by	  a	  recurrent	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  fitness	  
costs	   of	   relevant	   errors,	   natural	   selection	   should	   favour	   the	   evolution	   of	   cognitive	  
systems	  that	  minimize	  the	  more	  costly	  error(s).	  This	  logic	  has	  been	  used	  to	  undergird	  
an	   influential	   claim	   in	   the	   cognitive	   science	   of	   religion.	   Guthrie	   (1993)	   has	   argued	  
that,	   for	   humans	   in	   the	   ancestral	   past,	   mistaking	   an	   agent	   (e.g.,	   an	   approaching	  
predator)	  for	  an	  inanimate	  object	  (e.g.,	  a	  tree	  rustling	  in	  the	  wind)	  was	  more	  costly	  
than	  the	  converse	  error.	  Humans	  should	  therefore	  be	  equipped	  by	  natural	  selection	  
with	   biased	   agency-­‐detection	   mechanisms	   –	   what	   Barrett	   (2000,	   2004,	   2012)	   has	  
termed	  “Hyperactive	  [or	  hypersensitive]	  agent-­‐detection	  devices”	  (HADDs).	  
	  
HADDs	  are	  often	  described	  as	  perceptual	  mechanisms,	  devices	  biased	   towards	   the	  
perception	   of	   agents	   in	   ambiguous	   stimulus	   configurations.	   A	   byproduct	   of	   their	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functioning	   would	   be	   a	   tendency	   toward	   false	   positives	   (e.g.,	   perceiving	  
representations	  of	  human	  or	  animal	  figures	  in	  arbitrary	  collections	  of	  stars,	  or	  “faces	  
in	  the	  clouds”;	  Guthrie,	  1993).	  A	  broader	  conception	  of	  HADDs	  includes	  attributions	  
of	   nonrandom	   structure	   (Bloom,	   2007)	   –	   such	   as	   naturally	   occurring	   patterns	   and	  
events	  with	  no	  clear	  physical	  cause	  -­‐	  to	  the	  activity	  of	  agents.	  In	  other	  words,	  HADDs	  
are	  a	   suite	  of	  hypothetical	  devices	   specialized	   for	  perceiving	  either	  agents	  or	   their	  
effects.	   A	   corollary	   of	   these	   “proper	   functions”	   (Millikan,	   2005)	   would	   be	   the	  
postulation	  of	  unseen,	  or	  fleetingly	  visible,	  supernatural	  agents.	  Such	  notions,	  once	  
posited,	   would	   be	   attention	   grabbing,	   memorable	   and	   thus	   highly	   transmissible	  
because	   of	   their	   resonance	   with	   intuitive	   cognitive	   structures	   such	   as	   HADDs	  
(Barrett,	  2000;	  Barrett	  &	  Lanman,	  2008).	  Indeed,	  just	  as	  the	  cultural	  success	  of	  high	  
heeled	  shoes	  may	  owe	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  function	  as	  supernormal	  stimuli	  (insofar	  
as	  they	  exaggerate	  sex	  specific	  aspects	  of	  female	  gait;	  Morris	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  notions	  of	  
supernatural	   agency	   may	   represent	   supernormal	   stimuli	   for	   evolved	   agency-­‐
detection	  mechanisms.	  
	  
At	   present,	   the	   evidence	   for	   a	   connection	   between	   supernatural	   concepts	   and	  
beliefs	  and	  agency	  cognition	  is	  mixed.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Norenzayan	  and	  colleagues	  
(Norenzayan,	  Hansen	  &	  Cady,	  2008;	  Willard	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2013)	  have	   found	   that	  
tendencies	  to	  anthropomorphise	  (e.g.,	  to	  rate	  natural	  scenes	  using	  agentic	  concepts)	  
predict	  paranormal	  beliefs	  (i.e.,	  Psi,	  precognition)	  but	  not	  belief	  in	  God	  (at	  least	  not	  
for	  Christian	  participants,	  who	  may	  view	  anthropormorphism	  as	  akin	  to	  idolatry	  and	  
may	  therefore	  suppress	  it).	  Similarly,	  Van	  Elk	  (2013)	  found	  that	  whereas	  paranormal	  
beliefs	  were	   strongly	   related	   to	  a	   tendency	   to	  erroneously	   identify	  walking	  human	  
figures	   in	   point-­‐light	   displays	   (see	   also	   Krummenacher,	   Mohr,	   Haker	   &	   Brugger,	  
2010),	  traditional	  religious	  beliefs	  were	  not.	  However,	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  priming	  study,	  
van	  Elk,	  Rutjens,	  van	  der	  Pligt	  and	  van	  Harreveld	  (in	  press)	   found	  that	  participants’	  
religiosity	  moderated	   the	  effect	  of	   supernatural	  priming	  on	  agency	  detection,	   such	  
that	   religious	   participants	   perceived	   more	   agents	   and	   responded	   faster	   to	   face	  
stimuli	   following	   supernatural	   primes	   than	   non-­‐religious	   participants.	   Meanwhile	  
Riekki,	  Lindeman,	  Aleneff,	  Halme	  and	  Nuortimo	  (2013)	  found	  that	  religious	  believers	  
showed	  more	  of	  a	  bias	  than	  non-­‐believers	  to	  indicate	  that	  photographs	  of	  inanimate	  
scenes	   (e.g.,	   furniture,	  buildings,	  natural	   landscapes)	  contained	   face-­‐like	   images.	   In	  
all	  these	  studies	  agency	  detection	  was	  a	  measured	  variable.	  As	  far	  as	  we	  are	  aware,	  
to	   date	  no	  published	   study	  has	   investigated	  whether	  manipulating	   cues	  of	   agency	  
(e.g.,	  watching	  eyes;	  see	  below)	  can	  increase	  religious	  belief.	  Given	  the	  hypothesised	  
causal	  route	  (whereby	  agency	  detection	  biases	  predispose	  humans	  to	  acquire	  beliefs	  
in	  religious	  concepts),	  this	  may	  be	  a	  fruitful	  avenue	  for	  future	  research.	  
	  
Theory	  of	  Mind	  
Notions	   of	   supernatural	   beings	   as	   psychological	   entities	   with	   beliefs,	   preferences	  
and	   intentions	   -­‐	   intentional	   agents	   -­‐	  are	  also	   likely	   to	  be	  compelling	   for	  humans	   in	  
light	  of	  their	  expertise	  in	  representing,	  inferring	  and	  predicting	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  
others	   (Theory	   of	   Mind	   [ToM];	   Baron-­‐Cohen,	   1995;	   Mitchell,	   2009;	   Premack	   &	  
Woodruff,	   1978).	   Recent	   studies	   demonstrate	   a	   robust	   relationship	   between	   such	  
‘mentalizing’	   capacities	   and	   religious	   cognition	   (see	   Gervais,	   2013b).	   For	   example,	  
functional	   magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	   experiments	   with	   religious	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participants	   have	   shown	   that	   religious	   belief	   (Kapogiannis,	   Barbey,	   Su,	   Zambonia,	  
Krueger	   &	   Grafman,	   2009)	   and	   improvised	   prayer	   (Schjoedt,	   Stodkilde-­‐Jorgensen,	  
Geertz	   &	   Roepstorff,	   2009)	   engage	   neural	   networks	   subserving	   ToM	   capacities.	  
Moreover,	   supernatural	   believers	   rate	   the	   random	   movements	   of	   animated	  
geometric	   objects	   as	   more	   intentional	   than	   skeptics	   do,	   and	   evince	   stronger	  
activation	  of	  ToM-­‐related	  networks	  while	  viewing	  such	  animations	  (Riekki,	  Lindeman	  
&	   Raij,	   2014).	   Finally,	   Norenzayan,	   Gervais	   and	   Trzesniewski	   (2012)	   found	   that	  
autistic	   participants	   expressed	   less	   belief	   in	   God	   than	   did	   matched	   neurotypical	  
controls.	   In	   follow-­‐up	   studies	   using	   non-­‐clinical	   samples,	   these	   authors	   found	   that	  
higher	   autism	   scores	   predicted	   lower	   belief	   in	   God,	   a	   relationship	   mediated	   by	  
mentalizing	  abilities.	  
	  
ToM	   is	   also	   thought	   to	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   afterlife	   beliefs.	   It	   has	   been	  
suggested,	   for	   example,	   that	   people	   spontaneously	   infer	   that	   dead	   relatives	   and	  
friends	  are	  still	  present,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  cultural	  inputs	  to	  support	  such	  ideas.	  
Bering	   and	   colleagues	   conducted	   experiments	   with	   children	   (Bering	   &	   Bjorklund,	  
2004;	  Bering,	  Blasi	  &	  Bjorklund,	  2005)	  and	  adults	  (Bering,	  2002)	  in	  which	  participants	  
were	  presented	  with	   scenarios	  where	   specified	  agents	   (puppets	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	  
child	  studies)	  experienced	  various	  sensations,	  emotions,	  and	  thoughts	  prior	  to	  death	  
(e.g.,	  before	  being	  gobbled	  up	  by	  a	  crocodile-­‐shaped	  puppet).	  Participants	  of	  all	  ages	  
tended	   to	   make	   ‘discontinuity	   judgements’	   with	   respect	   to	   sensorimotor	   and	  
perceptual	  capacities,	  e.g.,	   inferring	   that	  a	  dead	  agent	  would	   immediately	   lose	   the	  
ability	  to	  walk,	  taste,	  smell,	  and	  feel	  hungry.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  participants	  
tended	  to	  reason	  that	  higher-­‐level	  cognitive	  functions,	  such	  as	  memories,	  emotions,	  
and	   beliefs,	   would	   continue	   to	   function	   normally,	   such	   responses	   being	   coded	   as	  
‘continuity	   judgements’	   (Cohen	   &	   Barrett,	   2008).	   Interestingly,	   this	   pattern	   was	  
stronger	   in	   younger	   children	   such	   that	   continuity	   judgements	   across	   all	   faculties	  
gradually	  diminished	  with	  age;	  however	  this	  pattern	  has	  not	  been	  replicated	  in	  some	  
other	  studies	  (Astuti	  &	  Harris,	  2008;	  Harris	  &	  Gimenez,	  2005).	  
	  
Bering’s	  explanation	  for	  these	  psychological	  findings	  hinges	  in	  part	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  
the	   ‘simulation	   constraint	   hypothesis’	   (see	  Hodge,	   2011,	   for	   a	   review).	   The	   idea	   is	  
that	  while	  we	   can	   simulate	   the	   loss	  of	  perceptual	   capacities	   like	   sight	   and	  hearing	  
simply	  by	  covering	  the	  relevant	  organs	  (the	  eyes	  and	  the	  ears)	  we	  cannot	  simulate	  
the	   absence	   of	   thoughts,	   desires,	   memories,	   and	   so	   on.	   The	   proposal	   is	   akin	   to	  
positing	  a	  “hyperactive”	  Theory	  of	  Mind,	  which	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  represent	  minds	  as	  
persisting	   irrespective	   of	  what	   happens	   to	   the	   body	   (for	   related	   ideas	   see	   Bloom,	  
2004;	   2007).	   Even	   people	   who	   hold	   explicitly	   extinctivist	   beliefs	   (e.g.,	   who	   are	  
adamant,	   when	   questioned,	   that	   personal	   consciousness	   is	   terminated	   at	   death)	  
make	   a	   striking	   number	   of	   continuity	   responses	  with	   respect	   to	  emotional,	   desire,	  
and	   epistemic	   states	  (Bering,	   2002,	   2006).	   The	   root	   of	   this,	   Bering	   argues,	   is	   that	  
humans	   have	   dedicated	   cognitive	   machinery	   for	   reasoning	   about	   mental	   states,	  
which,	   unlike	   our	   capacities	   for	   reasoning	   about	   the	   mechanical	   and	   biological	  
properties	  of	  bodies,	  cannot	  conceptualize	  total	  system	  failure.	  
	  
If	  Bering	  is	  right	  that	  humans	  are	  incapable	  of	  simulating	  the	  absence	  of	  higher-­‐level	  
cognitive	   functions,	   and	   if	   this	   putative	   incapacity	   is	   what	   underlies	   ‘continuity	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judgements’,	  then	  one	  would	  expect	  to	  observe	  a	  similar	  pattern	  in	  other	  scenarios	  
involving	   a	   complete	   lack	   of	   sentience	   or	   experience.	   For	   example,	   participants	  
should	   be	   unable	   to	   fully	   appreciate	   that	   people	   lack	   conscious	   experiences	  when	  
under	   general	   anaesthesia,	   or	   that	   inanimate	   objects	   such	   as	   carpets	   and	   kitchen	  
utensils	   lack	   such	   experiences.	   Although	   we	   think	   this	   is	   implausible,	   it	   is	   an	  
empirical	  question	  whether	  continuity	   judgments	  can	  be	  elicited	   in	  such	  scenarios.	  
We	   note	   in	   this	   connection	   that	   recent	   research	   on	   pre-­‐life	   beliefs	   in	   Ecuadorian	  
children	  indicates	  that,	  until	  about	  9-­‐10	  years	  of	  age,	  they	  ascribe	  several	  biological	  
and	  psychological	   capacities	   to	   their	  pre-­‐life	   selves;	  moreover,	  older	   children,	  who	  
ascribe	  fewer	  capacities	  to	  themselves	  overall,	  are	  still	  more	  likely	  to	  ascribe	  certain	  
mental	  states,	  in	  particular	  emotional	  and	  desire	  states,	  to	  their	  pre-­‐life	  selves	  than	  
other	  mental	  states	  (e.g.,	  perceptual,	  epistemic	  states)	  (Emmons	  &	  Kelemen,	  2014).	  
	  
Teleofunctional	  Explanations	  
Another	  foundational	  cognitive	  predisposition	  where	  religion	  is	  concerned	  may	  be	  a	  
tendency	  to	  favour	  teleofunctional	  reasoning.	  Research	  by	  Kelemen	  and	  colleagues	  
(e.g.,	   Kelemen,	   1999a,	   1999b,	   1999c,	   2004)	   suggests	   that	   children	   display	   a	   broad	  
inclination	   to	   view	   objects	   and	   behaviors	   of	   all	   kinds	   –	   including	   features	   of	   the	  
natural	   world	   -­‐	   as	   existing	   for	   a	   purpose.	   For	   instance,	   when	   confronted	   with	  
multiple	   accounts	   of	   why	   rocks	   are	   “pointy”,	   children	   tend	   to	   reject	   explanations	  
that	  appeal	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  long-­‐term	  erosion	  by	  wind	  and	  rain	  and	  prefer	  instead	  
functional	  accounts	  such	  as	  “rocks	  are	  pointy	  to	  stop	  elephants	  sitting	  on	  them”.	  
	  
Although	  it	  may	  be	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  this	  teleological	  bias	  is	  attributable	  simply	  
to	  acquisition	  of	  a	  creationist	  worldview	  (e.g.,	  regular	  retellings	  of	  the	  Genesis	  story),	  
several	   lines	   of	   evidence	   suggest	   otherwise.	   For	   instance,	   Evans	   (2001)	   has	   found	  
that	   irrespective	  of	  their	  community	  of	  origin	  (whether	  Christian	  fundamentalist	  or	  
nonfundamentalist),	   young	   children	   prefer	   “creationist”	   explanations	   of	   natural	  
phenomena;	   only	   later	   in	   development	   do	   the	   children	   of	   nonfundamentalists	  
diverge	   from	   the	   position	   that	   natural	   phenomena	   result	   from	   nonhuman	   design.	  
Research	   conducted	   with	   nonschooled	   Romani	   adults,	   who	   are	   unfamiliar	   with	  
scientific	  accounts	  of	  evolutionary	  origins,	  arguably	  demonstrates	  the	  persistence	  of	  
teleological	   intuitions	   into	   adulthood	   (Casler	  &	   Kelemen,	   2008).	  Moreover,	   elderly	  
patients	   suffering	   from	   Alzheimer’s	   disease,	   a	   condition	   that	   erodes	   semantic	  
memory	   (including	   scientific	   schemas),	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   accept	   and	   prefer	  
unwarranted	   teleological	   explanations	   than	   healthy	   participants	   (Lombrozo,	  
Kelemen	  &	  Zaitchik,	  2007).	  Finally,	  university	  students	  (Kelemen	  &	  Rosset,	  2009)	  and	  
even	   actively	   publishing	   physical	   scientists	   (Kelemen,	   Rottman	   &	   Seston,	   2013)	  
demonstrate	   increased	   acceptance	   of	   teleological	   explanations	   of	   natural	  
phenomena	  when	  their	   information-­‐processing	  resources	  are	   limited.	  These	  results	  
suggest	   that	   an	   underlying	   tendency	   to	   construe	   the	   world	   in	   functional	   terms	   is	  
present	   throughout	   life	   (Kelemen	  &	  Rosset,	  2009).	   If	   so,	   this	   tendency	  may	   render	  
notions	   of	   intelligent	   supernatural	   designers,	   who	   have	   created	   the	   world	   and	  
everything	  in	  it	  for	  a	  purpose,	  especially	  compelling	  (Kelemen,	  2004).	  
	  
Ojalehto,	   Waxman	   and	   Medin	   (2013)	   present	   an	   intriguing	   ‘relational-­‐deictic’	  
interpretation	  of	  this	  putative	  teleological	  bias.	  According	  to	  these	  authors,	  although	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many	   teleological	   explanations	   that	   children	   favour	   may	   seem	   “unwarranted”	  
(Kelemen	   &	   Rossett,	   2009;	   Kelemen	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   from	   a	   Western,	   scientific	  
perspective,	  this	  is	  a	  culturally	  infused	  stance.	  Thus,	  just	  as	  our	  tendency	  to	  speak	  of	  
the	   sun	   as	   “rising”	   reflects	   our	   particular	   geocentric	   perspective	   on	   the	   relation	  
between	   the	   earth	   and	   the	   sun	   and	   does	   not	   (anymore)	   represent	   our	   abstract	  
beliefs	   (Purzycki,	   2013),	   an	   utterance	   such	   as	   “rainclouds	   are	   for	   giving	   animals	  
water”	  may	  reflect	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  perspectival	  relations	  among	  living	  things	  
and	   their	   environments	   rather	   than	   a	   deep-­‐seated	   intuition	   about	   context-­‐
independent	   purpose	   in	   nature.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   this	   relational-­‐deictic	   stance	  
represents	  a	  cognitive	  default,	  however,	  it	  may	  still	  serve	  as	  a	  strong	  foundation	  for	  
religious	  cultural	  notions.	  In	  particular,	  although	  we	  agree	  with	  Ojalehto	  et	  al.	  (2013,	  
p.	  169)	  that	  “teleological	  statements	  do	  not	  necessarily	  signify	  a	  commitment	  to	  an	  
intentional	   creator”,	   we	   think	   it	   plausible	   that	   tendencies	   to	   view	   the	   world	   in	  
functional	   terms	   –	   whether	   the	   functions	   in	   question	   are	   intrinsic	   to	   entities	   or	  
relationships	   -­‐	  may	  make	  notions	  of	  purposeful	   creator	  beings	  especially	   resonant.	  
Recent	  evidence	   that	  acceptance	  of	   teleological	  explanations	   is	   related	   to	  belief	   in	  
God,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  belief	  in	  Nature	  as	  a	  powerful	  “being”	  (Kelemen	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  see	  
also	  Willard	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2013),	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  suggestion.	  
	  
The	  ‘Ritual	  Stance’	  
Humans	   often	   imitate	   each	   other	  without	   knowing	  why	   –	   that	   is,	  with	   little	   or	   no	  
understanding	  of	  how	  the	  actions	  contribute	  to	  goals.	  Causal	  opacity	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  a	  
hallmark	  feature	  of	  ritualized	  behaviour.	  In	  rituals,	  the	  relationship	  between	  actions	  
and	  stated	  goals	  (if	  indeed	  they	  are	  stated	  at	  all)	  cannot	  even	  in	  principle	  be	  specified	  
in	   physical-­‐causal	   terms	   (Whitehouse,	   2011;	   Herrmann,	   Legare,	   Harris	   &	  
Whitehouse,	   2013).	   Social	   anthropologists	   have	   often	   observed	   that	   ritual	  
participants	  are	  powerless	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  carry	  out	  their	  distinctive	  procedures	  
and	   ceremonies,	   appealing	   only	   to	   tradition	   or	   the	   ancestors.	   But	   of	   considerable	  
interest	   too	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   nobody	   has	   any	   difficulty	   understanding	   the	  
anthropologist’s	  question,	  when	  she	  asks	  what	   the	  rituals	  mean.	  People	  know	  that	  
ritualized	   actions	   can	   be	   invested	   with	   functions	   and	   symbolic	   properties	   even	  
though	  they	  may	  struggle	  on	  occasion	  to	  identify	  what	  those	  may	  be,	  often	  pointing	  
the	   hapless	   researcher	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   somebody	   older	   or	   wiser	   (Staal,	   1989;	  
Humphrey	  &	  Laidlaw,	  1994).	  	  
	  
Imitation	   of	   causally	   opaque	   behaviour	   is	   a	   distinctively	   human	   trait.	   None	   of	   the	  
other	  great	  apes	  shows	  a	  marked	  interest	  in	  devising	  highly	  stylized	  procedures	  and	  
bodily	  adornments	  and	  using	  these	  to	  demarcate	  and	  affiliate	  with	  cultural	  groups.	  
While	   chimpanzees	   and	   other	   primates	   do	   engage	   in	   social	   learning,	   they	   attend	  
preferentially	   to	   technically	   useful	   skills	   that	   transparently	   contribute	   to	   proximal	  
end	   goals	   (Call,	   Carpenter	   &	   Tomasello,	   2005).	   Since	   rituals	   lack	   overt	   usefulness	  
most	   animals	   would	   not	   see	   any	   value	   in	   copying	   them.	   Yet	   by	   meticulously	  
conforming	  to	  arbitrary	  social	  conventions	  human	  groups	  bind	  themselves	  together	  
into	  cooperative	  units	  facilitating	  cooperation	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  is	  very	  rare	  in	  nature.	  	  
	  
From	   an	   evolutionary	   perspective	   deriving	   the	   benefits	   of	   group	   living	   requires	   a	  
means	   of	   identifying	   ingroup	  members	   (the	   ones	   you	   should	   cooperate	  with)	   and	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outgroups	   (people	   you	   should	   avoid	   or	   compete	   with).	   One	   solution	   is	   to	   have	   a	  
distinctive	  set	  of	  group	  conventions	  or	  rituals	  (of	  course,	  there	  are	  other	  means	  too;	  
for	  example,	  humans	  use	   language	  to	  communicate	  about	  group	   identity).	  When	  a	  
set	   of	   rituals	   is	   performed	   frequently	   enough	   it	   becomes	   easy	   to	   identify	  
unauthorized	   innovations	   and	   so	   the	   group’s	   beliefs	   and	   practices	   can	   be	  
standardized	  across	  substantial	  populations	  (Whitehouse,	  2004).	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  many	  clues	  that	  ritualistic	  behaviour	  is	  written	  into	  our	  species’	  evolved	  
biological	  makeup	   is	   the	  fact	  that	   it	  emerges	  early	   in	  development	  (Nielsen,	  2006).	  
Even	  infants	  show	  considerable	  interest	  in	  causally	  opaque	  behaviour	  and	  will	  try	  to	  
copy	  it	  (Gergely,	  Bekkering	  &	  Király,	  2002).	  Indeed,	  the	  willingness	  to	  copy	  arbitrary	  
conventions	   is	  essential	  for	  acquiring	   language	  requiring	  us	  to	  accept	  that	  arbitrary	  
utterances	   refer	   to	   stable	   features	  of	   the	  world	   around	  us,	   not	  because	   there	   is	   a	  
causal	  relationship	  between	  the	  sound	  and	  the	  thing	  it	  refers	  to	  but	  simply	  because	  
that	   is	   the	   accepted	   convention.	   The	   human	   tendency	   to	   copy	   causally	   opaque	  
behaviour	   is	   sometimes	   called	   ‘overimitation’	   (Whiten,	  McGuigan,	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	  
&	  Hopper,	  2009).	  Psychologists	  have	  known	  for	  some	  time	  that	  if	  you	  show	  children	  
an	  unnecessarily	  complicated	  way	  of	  retrieving	  an	  object	  from	  a	  box	  they	  will	  copy	  
not	  only	  the	  causally	  necessary	  behaviour	  but	  will	  also	  copy	  the	  useless	  frills	  (Lyons,	  
Young	  &	   Keil,	   2007).	  One	   possibility	   is	   that	   overimitation	   evolved	   to	   help	   children	  
acquire	   complex	   technical	   skills	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   fuller	   understanding	   of	   their	  
underlying	  causal	  structure	  (Schulz,	  Hooppell	  &	  Jenkins,	  2008).	  Another	  possibility	  is	  
that	  overimitation	  is	  designed	  to	  help	  children	  learn	  arbitrary	  group	  conventions	  or	  
‘rituals.’	   Such	   behaviour	   may	   be	   motivated	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   belong,	   rather	   than	   to	  
learn	  anything	  technically	  useful	   (Kenward,	  Karlsson	  &	  Persson,	  2011;	  Herrmann	  et	  
al.,	  2013).	  This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  recent	  research	  showing	  that	  priming	  ostracism	  
threat	   increases	   the	   propensity	   to	   imitate	   causally	   opaque	   action	   sequences	  
(Watson-­‐Jones,	  Legare,	  Whitehouse	  &	  Clegg,	  2014).	  
	  
Kinship	  Detection	  
Inclusive	   fitness	   theory	   predicts	   that	   organisms	   will	   behave	   in	   ways	   that	  
preferentially	   benefit	   kin,	   with	   more	   benefits	   conferred	   as	   the	   degree	   of	   genetic	  
relatedness	   between	   the	   actor	   and	   the	   recipient	   increases	   (Hamilton,	   1964).	  
Mechanisms	  for	  recognizing	  and	  calibrating	  kinship	  are	  critical	  for	  such	  behaviours	  to	  
evolve	   and	   can	   be	   classified	   as	   one	   of	   two	   broad	   types:	   those	   that	   exploit	   direct,	  
phenotypic	   cues	   (e.g.,	   visual	   similarity	   to	   self)	   and	   those	   that	   exploit	   indirect,	  
contextual	  cues	  (e.g.,	  co-­‐residence	  early	  in	  life)	  (Penn	  &	  Frommen,	  2010;	  DeBruine	  et	  
al.,	   2011).	  According	   to	   Lieberman,	   Tooby	   and	  Cosmides	   (2007),	   cues	   indicative	  of	  
kinship	  are	  taken	  as	  input	  by	  two	  separate	  motivational	  systems.	  The	  first	  regulates	  
altruistic	   behaviors	   towards	   kin	   (Krupp,	   Debruine	   &	   Barclay,	   2008),	   whereas	   the	  
second	   regulates	   sexual	   attraction	   and	   aversion,	   thereby	   avoiding	   the	   deleterious	  
consequences	  associated	  with	  close	  inbreeding	  (Bittles	  &	  Neel,	  1994).	  
	  
As	   Pinker	   (2012)	   points	   out,	   kin	   recognition	   in	   humans	   depends	   on	   cues	   (in	  
particular,	  linguistic	  cues)	  that	  others	  can	  manipulate:	  
	  
Thus	  people	  are	  also	  altruistic	  toward	  their	  adoptive	  relatives,	  and	  toward	  a	  variety	  of	  fictive	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kin	   such	   as	   brothers	   in	   arms,	   fraternities	   and	   sororities,	   occupational	   and	   religious	  
brotherhoods,	  crime	   families,	   fatherlands,	  and	  mother	  countries.	  These	   faux-­‐families	  may	  be	  
created	  by	  metaphors,	  simulacra	  of	  family	  experiences,	  myths	  of	  common	  descent	  or	  common	  
flesh,	  and	  other	  illusions	  of	  kinship.	  
	  
Cultural	   manipulations	   of	   kinship	   detection	   machinery	   may	   be	   rife	   in	   ritualistic	  
behavior.	  As	  Saroglou	  (2011)	  notes,	  religious	  rituals	  serve	  to	  bond	  ritual	  participants	  
together.	   Such	   rituals	   may	   accomplish	   this,	   in	   part,	   by	   incorporating	   a	   range	   of	  
kinship	  cues.	  First,	  many	  religious	  rituals	  involve	  artificial	  phenotypic	  cues	  of	  kinship	  
–	   similar	   costumes,	   headdress,	   face	   paint	   etc.	   Second,	   social	   synchrony	   is	   a	   key	  
feature	  of	  many	  religious	  rituals,	  and	  has	  long	  been	  hypothesized	  to	  promote	  group	  
cohesion	   (e.g.,	   Durkheim,	   1915/	   1965;	   Turner,	   1969/1995).	   Recent	   experimental	  
studies	   confirm	   that	   synchronic	   movement	   increases	   cooperation	   among	  
participants.	  For	  example,	  Wiltermuth	  and	  Heath	  (2009)	  found	  that	  participants	  who	  
engaged	   in	   synchronic	   behaviours	   (e.g.,	   walking	   in	   step,	   synchronous	   singing	   and	  
moving)	   contributed	   more	   to	   the	   public	   good	   in	   subsequent	   group	   economic	  
measures	  than	  control	  participants.	  Fischer,	  Callander,	  Reddish	  and	  Bulbulia	   (2013)	  
investigated	  nine	  naturally	  occurring	  rituals	  and	  found	  that	  those	  which	  incorporated	  
synchronous	   body	  movements	   increased	   perceptions	   of	   oneness	   with	   their	   group	  
and	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  enhance	  prosocial	  attitudes	  about	  fellow	  ritual	  participants	  	  
(see	   also	   Hove	   &	   Risen,	   2009;	   Reddish,	   Fischer	   &	   Bulbulia,	   2013;	   Valdesolo	   &	  
DeSteno,	   2011;	   Valdesolo,	   Ouyang	   &	   DeSteno,	   2010).	   Interpersonal	   multisensory-­‐
stimulation	   experiments	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   synchronous	   stimulation	   causes	  
participants	  to	  perceive	  others	  as	  both	  more	  physically	  and	  psychologically	  similar	  to	  
themselves	   (Paladino,	   Mazzurega,	   Pavani,	   &	   Schubert,	   2010;	   Tajadura-­‐Jiménez,	  
Grehl	  &	  Tsakiris,	  2012;	  Tsakiris,	  2008).	  
	  
Third,	   the	  arousal	   that	  many	   rituals	   generate	  may	   function	   as	   a	   contextual	   cue	   to	  
kinship.	   In	   particular,	   co-­‐participants	   in	   intense,	  dysphorically	   arousing	   rituals	  may	  
gain	  a	  quantity	  of	  “shared	  experience”	  normally	  possible	  to	  accumulate	  only	  through	  
a	   large	   number	   -­‐	   perhaps	   a	   lifetime	   -­‐	   of	   shared	   interactions.	   As	   a	   result,	   such	  
experiences	  may	  activate	  context-­‐based	  kinship	  detection	  mechanisms,	  contributing	  
to	   group	   cohesion	   (Lanman	   &	  Whitehouse,	   submitted;	  Whitehouse	   &	   Lanman,	   in	  
press).	   Xygalatas	   et	   al.	   (2013)	   studied	   two	  Hindu	   rituals	   in	  Mauritius,	   a	   low-­‐ordeal	  
ritual	  involving	  singing	  and	  collective	  prayer,	  and	  a	  high-­‐ordeal	  ritual	  involving	  body	  
piercing,	  carrying	  and	  dragging	  heavy	  structures,	  and	  climbing	  a	  mountain	  to	  reach	  a	  
temple.	   Following	   the	   ritual,	   participants	   were	   paid	   around	   two	   days’	   salary	   for	  
participating	  in	  the	  study	  and	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  anonymously	  donate	  any	  part	  
of	   this	   money	   to	   the	   temple.	   High-­‐ordeal	   participants	   donated	   significantly	   more	  
than	  low-­‐ordeal	  participants,	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  self-­‐reported	  pain	  were	  associated	  
with	  greater	  donations.	  
	  
The	  Religion-­‐Morality	  Relationship	  in	  Biological	  Evolution	  
	  
A	  key	  feature	  of	  our	  approach	  is	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  fractionated	  components	  
of	  morality	  and	  religion	  have	  overlapping	  evolutionary	  histories.	  As	  noted	  above,	  just	  
as	   there	   are	   genetically	   endowed	   physical	   structures	   (e.g.,	   limbs	   and	   other	   bodily	  
appendages)	  and	  cultural	  artifacts	  (e.g.	  gloves	  and	  hats)	  that	  are	  shaped	  by	  (and	  in	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turn	  potentially	  shape)	  these	  structures,	  so	  there	  are	  genetically	  endowed	  cognitive	  
structures	   (innately	   specified	   cognitive	   mechanisms	   and	   intuitions)	   and	   cultural	  
concepts	  (e.g.,	  supernatural	  concepts,	  stories,	  and	  dogmas)	  that	  are	  shaped	  by	  (and	  
potentially	   shape)	   these	   structures.	   Some	   of	   these	   structures	   and	   concepts	   are	  
(perhaps	  arbitrarily)	  designated	  'religion'	  and	  some	  'morality'.	  Our	  strategy	  is	  first	  to	  
identify	   some	   of	   the	   key	   elements	   of	   our	   genetically	   inherited	   psychology	   and	  
to	  consider	  whether	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  any	  of	  the	  elements	  typically	  designated	  
as	   'religion'	  have	  a	  biologically	  evolved	  connection	   to	  any	  of	   the	  elements	   typically	  
designated	  as	  'morality.	  We	  now	  have	  before	  us	  two	  sets	  of	  domain-­‐specific	  evolved	  
psychological	  systems	  –	  a	  set	  of	  putative	  moral	   foundations	  and	  a	  set	  of	  candidate	  
religious	  foundations.	  Our	  fractionating	  strategy	  produces	  a	  preliminary	  matrix	  of	  at	  
least	   25	   basic	   questions	   at	   the	   level	   of	   biological	   evolution	   (e.g,	   “Is	   there	   a	  
biologically	   evolved	   connection	   between	   HADDs	   and	   the	   care/harm	   foundation?”;	  
“Is	   there	  a	  biologically	  evolved	  connection	  between	  kin	  detection	  mechanisms	  and	  
the	  authority/subversion	  foundation?”).	  
	  
In	  our	  view	  the	  most	  plausible	  cases	  of	  biologically	  evolved	  connections	  between	  the	  
religious	  and	  moral	  foundations	  involve	  agency-­‐detection	  mechanisms	  and	  Theory	  of	  
Mind.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Guthrie’s	   proposal	   is	   that	   biased	   agency-­‐perception	  
mechanisms	   (assuming	   they	   exist)	   are	   an	   adaptation	   for	   avoiding	  predators.	   If	   the	  
functioning	  of	  such	  mechanisms	   led	  to	  conclusions	  about	  the	  presence	  of	   invisible,	  
supernatural	   agents,	   this	   was	   (at	   least	   initially)	   merely	   a	   byproduct,	   a	   biological	  
spandrel	   (Gould	   &	   Lewontin,	   1979).	   Likewise,	   if	   the	   limitations	   of	   our	   evolved	  
capacities	   to	   simulate	   mental	   states,	   or	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   states,	   triggered	  
intuitions	   about	   the	   continued	   (invisible)	   presence	   of	   dead	   individuals,	   this	   would	  
have	   been	   incidental.	   However,	   Johnson,	   Bering,	   and	   colleagues	   (e.g.,	   Bering	   &	  
Johnson,	  2005;	   Johnson	  &	  Bering,	   2006;	   Johnson	  &	  Krueger,	   2004;	   Johnson,	  2009)	  
have	   suggested	   that	   such	   incidental	   deliverances	   may	   have	   been	   exapted	   for	   an	  
important	   function	  at	   a	   later	   evolutionary	   stage	   (an	  exaptation	   is	   a	   feature	  whose	  
benefits	   to	   the	   organism	   that	   possesses	   it	   are	   unrelated	   to	   the	   reasons	   for	   its	  
origination	   -­‐	   originally	   the	   feature	   may	   have	   served	   a	   different	   purpose	   [or	   no	  
purpose],	   but	   later	   became	   co-­‐opted	   for	   a	   new	   purpose;	   Barve	   &	  Wagner,	   2013;	  
Gould	  &	  Vrba,	  1982).	  
	  
The	   supposition	   of	   moral	   foundations	   theorists	   is	   that	   the	   various	   foundations	  
evolved	   to	   solve	   a	   range	   of	   adaptive	   problems	   (e.g.,	   as	   noted	   above,	   the	  
fairness/cheating	   foundation	   is	   thought	   to	  have	  evolved	  to	  procure	   the	  benefits	  of	  
two-­‐way	  partnerships;	  Baumard	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Graham	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  evolution	  of	  
these	  various	  mechanisms	  would	  have	  occasioned	  a	  novel	  set	  of	  selection	  pressures;	  
in	   particular,	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   being	   caught	   violating	   foundational	   moral	  
principles.	  According	   to	   Johnson,	  Bering,	  and	  colleagues,	   the	  evolution	  of	   linguistic	  
and	   mentalising	   capacities	   would	   have	   ramped	   up	   these	   costs,	   as	   moral	  
transgressions	  could	  be	  reported	  to	  absent	   third	  parties,	  exacerbating	  reputational	  
damage	   for	   the	   transgressor.	   The	   conjunction	   of	   these	   various	   mechanisms,	  
therefore,	   may	   have	   increased	   the	   premium	   on	   mechanisms	   that	   inhibit	   moral	  
transgressions.	  Intuitions	  about	  punitive	  supernatural	  observers	  –	  a	  short	  excursion	  
through	  Design	  Space	   (Dennett,	  1995)	   for	  mechanisms	   that	  are	  already	  generating	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ideas	   about	   invisible	   supernatural	   agents	   as	   a	  matter	  of	   course	   -­‐	  would	   fit	   the	  bill	  
here:	   “What	   better	  way	   [to	   avoid	   the	   fitness	   costs	   associated	  with	   the	   real-­‐world	  
detection	  of	  moral	  transgressions]	  than	  to	  equip	  the	  human	  mind	  with	  a	  sense	  that	  
their	   every	   move	   –	   even	   thought	   –	   is	   being	   observed,	   judged,	   and	   potentially	  
punished?”	  (Johnson,	  2009,	  p.	  178).	  
	  
The	   notion	   that	   humans	   have	   a	   genetically	   endowed	   propensity	   to	   postulate	  
moralizing,	  punitive	  supernatural	  observers	   is	  both	  compelling	  and	  controversial.	   If	  
intuitions	   about	   punitive	   supernatural	   observers	   are	   a	   biological	   mechanism	   for	  
inhibiting	  moral	   transgressions,	   we	   should	   expect	   activation	   of	   these	   intuitions	   to	  
have	  the	  relevant	  inhibitory	  effect.	  Below	  we	  review	  the	  evidence	  for	  this	  hypothesis.	  
	  
Supernatural	  Agent	  Intuitions	  and	  Morality	  
Surveys	   indicate	   that	   people	   who	   score	   higher	   on	   indices	   of	   religiosity	   (e.g.,	  
frequency	  of	  prayer	  and	  religious	  service	  attendance)	   reliably	  	   report	  more	  helping	  
behaviours	  such	  as	  charitable	  donations	  (Brooks,	  2006;	  Putnam	  &	  Campbell,	  2010).	  
As	  Norenzayan	  and	  Shariff	   (2008)	  have	  persuasively	  argued,	  however,	   this	   “charity	  
gap”	  could	  be	  due	  to	  an	  important	  confound:	  it	  may	  be	  that	  religious	  individuals	  are	  
simply	  more	  motivated	  to	  maintain	  a	  moral	  reputation	  than	  nonreligious	  individuals	  
(see	   also	   Batson,	   Schoenrade	   &	   Ventis,	   1993;	   Sablosky,	   2014).	   This	   would	   render	  
religious	   individuals	  more	   susceptible	   to	   social	   desirability	   concerns,	   to	  which	   self-­‐
report	  measures	  of	  socially	  desirable	  behaviours	  are	  notoriously	  vulnerable	  (Paulhus,	  
1991).	   Indeed,	   studies	  have	   found	  a	  consistent	  empirical	   link	  between	  religion	  and	  
socially	  desirable	  responding	  (Sedikides	  &	  Gebauer,	  2010;	  Eriksson	  &	  Funcke,	  2014),	  
which	   raises	   the	   prospect	   that	   results	   linking	   religion	   with	  moral	   behavior	   largely	  
reflect	   concerns	   to	   present	   a	   positive	   image	   to	   the	   researcher	   (Galen,	   2012;	  
Saroglou,	   2012,	   2013).	   Some	   studies	  have	   found	   that	   a	   link	  between	   self-­‐reported	  
religiosity	  and	  self-­‐reported	  altruism	  remains	  even	  when	  social	  desirability	  concerns	  
are	  measured	  and	  controlled	  for	  (e.g.,	  Saroglou,	  Pichon,	  Trompette,	  Verschueren	  &	  
Dernelle,	  2005).	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  religiosity	  and	  
self-­‐enhancement	  is	  due	  to	  self-­‐stereotyping	  rather	  than	  to	  concerns	  with	  projecting	  
a	  positive	  image	  (Eriksson	  &	  Funcke,	  2014),	  attempts	  to	  control	  for	  socially	  desirable	  
responding	   may	   not	   eliminate	   all	   relevant	   sources	   of	   response	   bias	   in	   self-­‐report	  
measures.	  Accordingly,	  experiments	  with	  behavioural	  measures	  should	  be	  consulted	  
wherever	  possible	  (Norenzayan	  &	  Shariff,	  2008).	  
	  
A	   growing	   body	   of	   studies	   have	   utilised	   experimental	   and	   naturalistic	   priming	  
paradigms	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   uncover	   causal	   –	   rather	   than	   merely	   correlational	   -­‐	  
relationships	   between	   concepts	   of	   supernatural	   agency	   and	   morally	   relevant	  
behaviours	  (see	  Norenzayan	  &	  Shariff,	  2008;	  Shariff	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2007).6	  To	  date,	  
                                                
6	  All	  undergraduate	  psychology	  students	  learn	  that	  correlation	  does	  not	  imply	  causation.	  This	  lesson	  is	  
particularly	   important	   when	   considering	   evidence	   germane	   to	   the	   religion-­‐morality	   debate.	   To	  
illustrate,	  Branas-­‐Garza,	  Espın	  and	  Neuman	  (2014)	  used	  economic	  games	  such	  as	  the	  dictator	  game	  
(see	   fn.	   7)	   to	   explore	   the	   relationship	   between	   individual	   religious	   variables	   and	   morally	   relevant	  
social	  behaviours	   (e.g.,	  altruism,	   fairness)	   in	  a	   large	  Spanish	  sample.	  Although	  they	   found	  a	  positive	  
relationship	  between	   intensity	  of	   religiosity	  and	  prosociality	  on	   their	  measures,	   they	  acknowledged	  
 
  25 
such	   studies	   have	   found	   evidence	   that	   compared	   to	   control	   participants	   those	  
primed	  with	  supernatural	  concepts	  are	  more	  cooperative	  in	  experimental	  economic	  
measures	  such	  as	  dictator	  games	  (Shariff	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2007;	  Ahmed	  &	  Salas,	  2011;	  
cf.	   Benjamin,	   Choi	   &	   Fisher,	   2010),	   public	   goods	   games	   (Ahmed	   &	   Hammarstedt,	  
2011;	   Benjamin	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   common-­‐pool	   resource	   games	   (Xygalatas,	   2013)	   and	  
prisoner’s	   dilemma	  games	   (Ahmed	  &	   Salas,	   2011)7.	  Moreover,	   primed	  participants	  
evince	  greater	  intention	  to	  help	  others	  (Malhotra,	  2008;	  Pichon,	  Boccato	  &	  Saroglou,	  
2007;	   Pichon	   &	   Saroglou,	   2009),	   less	   willingness	   to	   cheat	   (Aveyard,	   2014;	   Bering,	  
McLeod	   &	   Shackelford,	   2005;	   Carpenter	   &	  Marshall,	   2009;	   Mazar,	   Amir	   &	   Ariely,	  
2008;	  Randolph-­‐Seng	  &	  Nielsen,	   2007),	   and	  greater	   self-­‐control	   (Friese	  &	  Waenke,	  
2014;	  Laurin,	  Kay	  &	  Fitzsimons,	  2012;	  Rounding,	  Lee	  &	  Jacobson,	  2012;	  Toburen	  &	  
Meier,	  2010;	  cf.	  Harrison	  &	  McKay,	  2013).8	  
	  
One	   limitation	   of	   some	   of	   these	   behavioural	   studies,	   from	   a	   pluralistic	   moral	  
perspective,	   is	   that	   competing	   moral	   motivations	   are	   sometimes	   conflated.	   For	  
example,	   given	   the	   effect	   of	   religious	   priming	   on	   dictator	   game	   allocations,	   one	  
might	   conclude	   that	   such	   priming	   activates	   the	   care	   foundation,	   promoting	  moral	  
concerns	  for	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  others.	  An	  alternative	  possibility,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  
increased	   giving	   in	   the	   dictator	   game	   reflects	   the	   activation	   of	   the	   fairness	  
foundation.	   For	   instance,	   the	   most	   frequent	   behaviour	   for	   religiously	   primed	  
participants	  in	  Shariff	  and	  Norenzayan’s	  (2007)	  studies	  was	  to	  transfer	  exactly	  half	  of	  
the	   available	   money	   (in	   accordance	   with	   a	   salient	   norm	   of	   fairness),	   whereas	   for	  
control	   participants	   the	   most	   frequent	   behaviour	   was	   to	   transfer	   nothing.	   (This	  
might	  be	  seen	  as	  compelling	  evidence	  that	  fairness	  concerns	  were	  paramount	  here.	  
However,	   although	   the	  modal	   response	   was	   to	   transfer	   half	   of	   the	  money,	   some	  
participants	   in	   the	   religious	   prime	   condition	   transferred	  more	   than	   half	   -­‐	   strictly	  
speaking,	  an	  unfair	  allocation.)	  A	  similar	   issue	  arises	  when	  considering	  the	  study	  of	  
Pichon	   et	   al.	   (2007).	   These	   authors	   found	   that	   participants	   primed	   with	   positive	  
religion	   words	   (e.g.,	   heaven)	   collected	   more	   pamphlets	   advertising	   a	   charity	  
                                                                                                                                      
that	   the	   causality	   of	   this	   relationship	   could	   have	   run	   from	   prosociality	   to	   religiosity;	   or	   that	  
unobserved	  third	  variables	  may	  have	  influenced	  both	  prosociality	  and	  religiosity.	  
7	  The	  dictator	  game	  is	  an	  anonymous,	  two-­‐player	  “game”	   in	  which	  the	  first	  player	  must	  decide	  how	  
much	   of	   a	   monetary	   endowment	   to	   distribute	   to	   the	   second	   player.	   The	   second	   player	   has	   a	  
completely	  passive	  role	  (which	  is	  why	  the	  dictator	  game	  is	  not,	  strictly	  speaking,	  a	  game),	  and	  must	  
accept	  whatever	  the	  first	  player	  transfers.	  In	  a	  public	  goods	  game,	  players	  privately	  choose	  how	  much	  
of	   an	   endowment	   to	   donate	   to	   a	   public	   pot.	   Total	   donations	   are	   subsequently	  multiplied	   by	   some	  
factor	   (greater	   than	   1	   but	   less	   than	   the	   number	   of	   players)	   and	   this	   “public	   good”	   payoff	   is	   then	  
distributed	   evenly	   among	   all	   players	   (a	   common-­‐pool	   resource	   game	   is	   similar,	   but	   players	   choose	  
how	  much	  to	  withdraw	   from	  a	  collective	  pot;	   if	  total	  withdrawals	  exceed	  the	  amount	  in	  the	  pot,	  no	  
player	   receives	   anything).	   A	   prisoner’s	   dilemma	   game	   is	   essentially	   a	   simplified	   public	   goods	   game	  
played	  with	  two	  players.	  
8	  Although	  some	  authors	  have	  suggested	  that	  moral	  conduct	  of	  any	  kind	  may	  be	  impossible	  without	  
self-­‐control	  (e.g.,	  according	  to	  Baumeister	  and	  Exline	  [1999,	  p.	  1175]	  “it	  is	  fair	  to	  consider	  self-­‐control	  
the	   master	   virtue”),	   the	   relationship	   between	   self-­‐control	   and	   morality	   is	   complex.	   For	   example,	  
punishment	   of	   unfairness	   has	   been	   associated	   both	   with	   self-­‐control	   (e.g.,	   Knoch,	   Pascual-­‐Leone,	  
Meyer,	   Treyer	   &	   Fehr,	   2006;	   Lakshminarayanan	  &	   Santos;	   2009)	   and	  with	   its	   opposite,	   impulsivity	  
(e.g.,	  Crockett,	  Clark,	  Lieberman,	  Tabibnia	  &	  Robbins,	  2010;	  Pillutla	  &	  Murningham,	  1996;	  see	  Espín,	  
Brañas-­‐Garza,	  Herrmann	  &	  Gamella,	   2012).	  At	  present	   there	   is	  no	  official	  moral	   foundation	  of	   self-­‐
control.	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organization	   than	   participants	   primed	   with	   neutral	   religion	   words	   (e.g.,	   parish),	  
positive	   words	   unrelated	   to	   religion	   (e.g.,	   liberty)	   or	   neutral	   words	   unrelated	   to	  
religion	  (e.g.,	  shirt).	  One	  might	  conclude	  that	  religious	  priming	  (or,	  at	  least,	  positive	  
religious	   priming)	   had	   activated	   compassion	   for	   the	   disadvantaged.	   But	   charitable	  
behaviours	   or	   concerns	   could	   also	   be	   driven	   by	   an	   aversion	   to	   inequity	   (Fehr	   &	  
Schmidt,	  1999).	  
	  
Notwithstanding	   these	   interpretive	   complexities,	   the	   results	   of	   the	   above	   studies,	  
taken	  together,	  would	  seem	  to	   indicate	  that	  religious	  priming	  promotes	  adherence	  
to	  moral	   norms.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   picture	  may	   be	  more	   complicated	   than	   this,	   as	  
other	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  religious	  priming	  also	  elicits	  a	  range	  of	  aggressive	  and	  
prejudicial	   behaviours.	   For	   example,	   Bushman,	   Ridge,	   Das,	   Key	   and	   Busath	   (2007)	  
found	  that	  participants	  who	  read	  a	  description	  of	  violent	  retaliation	  commanded	  by	  
God	   were	   subsequently	   more	   aggressive	   than	   participants	   who	   read	   the	   same	  
description	  but	  with	  the	  passage	  about	  God’s	  sanction	  omitted.	  Saroglou,	  Corneille	  
and	  Van	  Cappellen	  (2009)	  found	  that	  religiously	  primed	  participants	  encouraged	  by	  
the	   experimenter	   to	   exact	   revenge	   on	   an	   individual	   who	   had	   allegedly	   criticized	  
them	  were	  more	  vengeful	  than	  those	  given	  neutral	  primes.	  Van	  Pachterbeke,	  Freyer	  
and	  Saroglou	  (2011)	  found	  that	  religiously	  primed	  participants	  displayed	  support	  for	  
impersonal	   societal	   norms	   even	   where	   upholding	   such	   norms	   would	   harm	  
individuals	  (the	  effects	  reported	  by	  Saroglou	  et	  al.	  and	  Van	  Pachterbeke	  et	  al.	  were	  
limited	   to	   participants	   scoring	   high	   on	   measures	   of	   submissiveness	   and	  
authoritarianism,	   respectively).	   Johnson,	   Rowatt	   and	   LaBouff	   (2010)	   found	   that	  
subliminal	   priming	   of	   Christian	   concepts	   in	   ethnically	   diverse	   participant	   samples	  
increased	  covert	  racial	  prejudice	  and	  negative	  affect	  toward	  African	  Americans	  (see	  
also	  LaBouff,	  Rowatt,	  Johnson	  &	  Finkle,	  2012;	  Van	  Tongeren,	  Raad,	  McIntosh	  &	  Pae,	  
2013).	   And	   Ginges	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   found	   that	   Jewish	   settlers	   were	   more	   likely	   to	  
endorse	   as	   “extremely	   heroic”	   a	   suicide	   attack	   carried	   out	   against	  Muslims	   by	   an	  
Israeli	  Jew	  when	  primed	  with	  synagogue	  attendance	  than	  when	  unprimed.	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	   religious	   priming	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   elicit	   both	   “prosocial”	   and	  
“nonprosocial”	  effects	  (Galen,	  2012)	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  something	  of	  a	  contradiction	  
or	   inconsistency	   (e.g.,	  Preston	  &	  Ritter,	  2013;	  Saroglou,	  2006).	  One	  might	   suppose	  
that	   the	   effects	   of	   such	   priming	   on	   aggression	   and	   prejudice	   count	   against	   the	  
hypothesis	   that	   intuitions	   about	   supernatural	   observers	   inhibit	   moral	   norm	  
violations.	  But	  without	  knowing	  what	  participants	  perceive	  as	  the	  relevant	  norm,	  this	  
is	   difficult	   to	   establish.	   It	  may	   be	   that	   the	   putative	   “nonprosocial”	   effects	   involve	  
adherence	   to,	   rather	   than	   violation	   of,	   a	   perceived	   norm.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	  
Bushman	  et	  al.	   (2007)	  study,	  God’s	  apparent	  sanctioning	  of	  violent	   retaliation	  may	  
reasonably	   be	   perceived	   as	   establishing	   a	   religious	   norm	   that	   participants	   then	  
adhere	   to	   by	   behaving	   aggressively	   (Preston	   &	   Ritter,	   2013;	   see	   Blogowska	   &	  
Saroglou,	  2013).	  
	  
There	   are	   other	   reasons	   to	   doubt	   that	   religious	   priming	   studies	   demonstrate	   that	  
activating	  intuitions	  about	  punitive	  supernatural	  agents	  curbs	  moral	  infractions.	  For	  
example,	  although	  Shariff	  and	  Norenzayan	  suggested	  that	  their	  primes	  had	  “aroused	  
an	   imagined	   presence	   of	   supernatural	   watchers”	   (p.	   807),	   Randolph-­‐Seng	   and	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Nielsen	  (2008)	  argued	  that	  the	  use	  of	  primes	  that	  are	  semantically	  associated	  with	  
moral	  behaviour	  (‘God’,	  for	  example)	  may	  lead	  to	  moral	  behaviour	  simply	  by	  virtue	  
of	   that	   association.	   This	   “behavioural	   priming”	   interpretation	   of	   Shariff	   and	  
Norenzayan’s	   results	   is	   consistent	  with	   their	   discovery,	   in	   their	   second	   study,	   that	  
the	   effect	   on	   dictator	   game	   behaviour	   of	   ‘secular’	   primes	   (civic,	   jury,	   court,	  police	  
and	   contract)	   was	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   religious	   primes.	   Randolph-­‐Seng	   and	  
Nielsen	  (2008)	  ask	  why	  secular	  primes	  such	  as	  ‘civic’	  and	  ‘contract’	  should	  increase	  
giving	   behaviour	   if	   such	   behaviour	   results	   from	   the	   activation	   of	   ‘supernatural	  
watcher’	  concepts.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  secular	  primes,	  they	  suggest,	  is	  more	  consistent	  
with	  the	  behavioural	  priming	  explanation.	  
	  
Similar	   considerations	   apply	   to	   a	   study	   by	   Mazar	   et	   al.	   (2008),	   who	   found	   that	  
participants	  who	  wrote	  down	   the	   titles	   of	   ten	  books	   they	  had	   read	   in	   high	   school	  
cheated	  on	  a	  subsequent	  task	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so,	  whereas	  participants	  
who	  instead	  wrote	  down	  the	  Ten	  Commandments	  did	  not.	  In	  a	  second	  study	  these	  
authors	   found	   that	   a	   secular	   reminder	   of	   morality	   (a	   statement	   about	   the	  
university’s	   honour	   code)	   had	   the	   same	   effect	   on	   cheating	   as	   the	   Ten	  
Commandments	  prime.	  More	  recently,	  Ma-­‐Kellams	  and	  Blascovich	  (2013)	  found	  that	  
even	   primes	   of	   science	   (e.g.,	   words	   such	   as	  hypothesis,	   laboratory,	   and	   scientists)	  
promoted	   adherence	   to	   moral	   norms	   and	   morally	   normative	   behaviours	   (these	  
researchers	  examined	  morality	  primarily	  in	  the	  harm/care	  and	  fairness	  domains).	  
	  
McKay	   and	   Dennett	   (2009),	   however,	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   primes	   used	   in	   such	  
cases	   do	   not	   enable	   clear	   adjudication	   between	   the	   surveillance	   and	   ‘behavioural	  
priming’	  accounts.	  For	  example,	  both	  the	  ‘religious’	  and	  ‘secular’	  conditions	  in	  Shariff	  
and	   Norenzayan’s	   (2007)	   second	   study	   included	   words	   associated	   not	   just	   with	  
moral	  behaviour	  but	  also	  with	  intelligent	  agents	  (‘God’	  and	  ‘prophet’	  in	  the	  religious	  
condition,	   ‘jury’	   and	   ‘police’	   in	   the	   secular	   condition).	   Gervais	   and	   Norenzayan	  
(2012a)	  have	  recently	  shown	  that	  participants	  exposed	  to	  Shariff	  and	  Norenzayan’s	  
(2007)	  religious	  primes	  showed	  a	  subsequent	  increase	  both	  in	  public	  self-­‐awareness	  
and	  socially	  desirable	  responding,	  two	  variables	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  perception	  
of	   being	   observed.	   This	   result	   seems	   an	   impressive	   substantiation	   of	   Shariff	   and	  
Norenzayan’s	   (2007)	   supernatural	   watcher	   hypothesis.	   It	   remains	   to	   be	  
demonstrated,	  however,	  that	  the	  perception	  that	  one	  is	  observed	  is	  what	  mediates	  
the	   effect	   of	   the	   primes	   on	   behaviour.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   religious	   priming	   might	  
activate	   both	   surveillance	   concerns	   and	   moral	   concepts,	   but	   that	   only	   the	   latter	  
influence	  game	  behaviour.9	  
	  
Above	  we	  mentioned	  methods	   that	  potentially	   conflate	  distinct	  moral	  motivations	  
(e.g.,	  the	  care	  and	  fairness	  foundations).	  The	  contrast	  between	  care	  and	  fairness	   is	  
perhaps	  starkest	  when	  considering	  retributive	  punishment	  (‘an	  eye	  for	  an	  eye’)	  and	  
forgiveness	  (‘turn	  the	  other	  cheek’).	   Jesus	  preached	  the	   latter	   (e.g.,	  Matthew	  5:39;	  
                                                
9	  Ritter	   and	  Preston	   (2013)	   conducted	   a	   sophisticated	   recent	   investigation	  of	   lay	   understandings	  of	  
religious	   prime	  words,	   finding	   evidence	   for	   the	   cognitive	   representation	   of	   three	   relatively	   distinct	  
classes	  of	  religious	  concept:	  agent	  concepts	  (e.g.,	  god,	  angel),	  spiritual/abstract	  concepts	  (e.g.,	  faith,	  
belief),	  and	  institutional/concrete	  concepts	  (e.g.,	  shrine,	  scripture).	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Luke	   6:29),	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   arguably	   prioritized	   kindness	   and	   compassion	   over	  
fairness	   and	   justice	   (the	   command	   to	   ‘turn	   the	   other	   cheek’	   is	   effectively	   an	  
endorsement	   of	   ‘second-­‐order’	   free	   riding;	   Panchanathan	   &	   Boyd,	   2004).10 	  The	  
dichotomy	  between	  forgiveness	  and	  punishment	  provides	  a	  potential	  empirical	  lever	  
for	  teasing	  apart	  the	  effects	  of	  supernatural	  primes	  on	  kindness	  and	  fairness.	  What	  
effect	  would	  such	  primes	  have	  on	  the	  altruistic	  punishment	  of	  unfair	  behaviour	  (Fehr	  
&	   Gaechter,	   2002)?	   If	   supernatural	   primes	   activate	   concerns	   for	   fairness,	   then	  
primed	  participants	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  punish	  violations	  of	  fairness	  norms.	  If,	  
on	   the	   other	   hand,	   such	   primes	   stimulate	   kindness,	   then	   participants	  may	   be	   less	  
likely	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  punishment.	  
	  
A	   study	   by	  McKay,	   Efferson,	  Whitehouse	   and	   Fehr	   (2011)	   bears	   on	   this	   question.	  
Participants	   were	   primed	   subliminally	   with	   the	   concepts	   of	   religion	   and/or	  
punishment,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  subsequently	  punished	  unfair	  offers	   in	  a	  
punishment	  game	  was	  measured.	  We	  found	  that	  religious	  primes	  strongly	  increased	  
the	  costly	  punishment	  of	  unfair	  behaviours	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  our	  participants	  –	  those	  
who	   had	   previously	   donated	   to	   a	   religious	   organization.	   This	   finding	   seems	  
consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  supernatural	  agency	  concepts	  promote	  fairness	  and	  
its	   enforcement,	   although	   as	   this	   study	   did	   not	   disambiguate	   agency	   and	   moral	  
dimensions	  along	  the	  lines	  suggested	  above,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  the	  effect	  here	  was	  due	  
to	   behavioural	   priming	   of	   moral	   behaviour	   (in	   this	   case	   punishment	   of	   unfair	  
behaviour)	   rather	   than	   to	   activation	   of	   supernatural	   agent	   concepts.	   Another	  
problem	   is	   that	   different	   idiosyncratic	   conceptions	   of	   God	   (e.g.,	   compassionate	  
versus	   punitive)	   may,	   when	   primed,	   result	   in	   very	   different	   behaviours.	   Earlier	  
studies,	   for	   example,	   have	   found	   that	   whereas	   people	   who	   report	   having	   a	   close	  
personal	  relationship	  with	  a	   loving	  God	  are	   less	   likely	  to	  support	  the	  death	  penalty	  
(Unnever,	   Cullen	   &	   Bartkowski,	   2006),	   those	   who	   conceive	   of	   God	   as	   a	   powerful	  
dispenser	  of	  justice	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  death	  penalty	  (Unnever,	  Cullen	  &	  
Applegate,	  2005;	   see	  also	  Shariff	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2011).	  Where	  possible,	   therefore,	  
priming	   studies	   should	   attempt	   to	  measure	   idiosyncratic	   conceptions	  of	  God	   (e.g.,	  
Laurin,	  Shariff,	  Henrich	  &	  Kay,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Overall	  we	   think	   that	   religious	   priming	   studies	   provide	   at	   least	   tentative	   evidence	  
that	   activating	   intuitions	   about	   supernatural	   agents	   curbs	   moral	   norm	   violations.	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  almost	  all	  of	  these	  studies	  were	  conducted	  in	  
WEIRD	   societies	   (Henrich	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   typically	   using	   undergraduate	   student	  
                                                
10	  In	  contrast,	  Dante’s	  persona	  in	  the	  Divine	  Comedy	  appears	  to	  relish	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  sinners	  who	  
are	  experiencing	  divine	  justice	  in	  hell:	  
	  
And	  I:	  ‘Master,	  I	  would	  be	  most	  eager	  
To	  see	  him	  pushed	  deep	  down	  into	  this	  soup	  
Before	  we	  leave	  the	  lake.’	  
	  
Soon	  I	  watched	  him	  get	  so	  torn	  to	  pieces	  
By	  the	  muddy	  crew,	  I	  still	  give	  praise	  
And	  thanks	  to	  God	  for	  it.	  (Inferno,	  VIII:	  52-­‐54;	  58-­‐60)	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populations.11	  The	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   effects	   generalize	   to	   other	   cultures	   is	  
therefore	  unclear.	  But	  what	  of	  the	  intuitions	  themselves?	  
	  
The	  Cross-­‐Cultural	  Prevalence	  of	  Supernatural	  Punishment	  Concepts	  
If	   intuitions	   about	   such	   supernatural	   punishers	   are	   properly	   foundational,	   they	  
should	   be	   culturally	   and	   historically	   widespread.	   However,	   Baumard	   and	   Boyer	  
(2013a)	   note	   that	   the	   gods	   of	   numerous	   classical	   traditions	   (e.g.,	   Greek,	   Roman,	  
Chinese,	  Hindu)	  “were	  generally	  construed	  as	  unencumbered	  with	  moral	  conscience	  
and	  uninterested	   in	  human	  morality”	   (p.	  272;	   see	  also	  Baumard	  &	  Boyer,	   in	  press;	  
Schlieter,	   2014).	   Further	   illustration	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   historical	   variability	   in	   this	  
respect	   comes	   from	   The	   Standard	   Cross	   Cultural	   Sample	   (SCCS)12,	  which	   sorts	   the	  
variable	  “high	  gods”	  into	  four	  categories:	  (1)	  “Absent	  or	  not	  reported,”	  (2)	  “Present	  
but	   not	   active	   in	   human	   affairs,”	   (3)	   “Present	   and	   active	   in	   human	   affairs	   but	   not	  
supportive	  of	  human	  morality,”	  and	  (4)	  “Present,	  active,	  and	  specifically	  supportive	  
of	   human	  morality”	   (Divale,	   2000;	   see	   Johnson,	   2005;	   Roes	   &	   Raymond,	   2003).	   It	  
seems	  clear	  that	  not	  all	  supernatural	  agents	  are	  explicitly	  represented	  as	  taking	  an	  
interest	   in	  human	  morality:	   insofar	   as	   the	   gods	  monitor	  human	  behavior,	   in	  many	  
traditions	   this	   is	   primarily	   to	   oversee	   adherence	   to	   nonmoral	   strictures	   and	   the	  
appropriate	  performance	  of	  costly	   rituals	  and	  sacrifices	   (Purzycki,	  2011;	  Purzycki	  &	  
Sosis,	  2011).	  
	  
Although	   these	  considerations	  may	   seem	  to	   refute	  any	   suggestion	   that	  moralizing,	  
punitive	   supernatural	   agents	   are	   historically	   and	   cross-­‐culturally	   universal,	   recent	  
work	  suggests	  that	  even	  where	  Gods	  are	  not	  explicitly	  represented	  as	  caring	  about	  
human	  morality,	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  moral	  undercurrent	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  
such	  explicit,	  reflective	  representations	  (Purzycki,	  2013).	  For	  example,	  ethnic	  Tyvans	  
(from	  the	  central	  Asian	  Republic	  of	  Tuva)	  rate	  spirit-­‐masters’	  knowledge	  and	  concern	  
about	  moral	   information	   (e.g.,	   theft)	   higher	   than	   nonmoral	   information	   (Purzycki,	  
2013),	  despite	  explicitly	  denying	  that	  spirit-­‐masters	  care	  about	   interpersonal	  moral	  
behavior	  (Purzycki,	  2010).	  
	  
                                                
11	  Two	  exceptions	  are	  Hadnes	  and	  Schumacher	  (2012)	  and	  Aveyard	  (2014).	  Hadnes	  and	  Schumacher	  
found	   that	   priming	   West	   African	   villagers	   with	   traditional	   beliefs	   substantially	   increased	   their	  
prosocial	   behavior	   in	   an	   economic	   trust	   game.	   Aveyard	   tested	   a	   sample	   of	  Middle	   Eastern	  Muslim	  
undergraduates	   and	   found	   that	  whereas	   a	   laboratory	   priming	  manipulation	   had	   no	   effect	   on	   their	  
cheating	   rates,	   participants	   exposed	   to	   a	   naturalistic	   religious	   prime	   –	   the	   Islamic	   call	   to	   prayer	   –	  
cheated	  substantially	  less.	  
12	  The	  SCCS	  is	  a	  database	  of	  186	  well-­‐documented	  human	  societies,	  spanning	  contemporary	  hunter-­‐
gatherers,	   early	   historic	   states	   and	   contemporary	   industrial	   societies.	   The	   sample	   was	   devised	   by	  
Murdock	  and	  White	  (1969)	  and	  selected	  such	  that	  the	  included	  cultures	  capture	  the	  world’s	  regions	  
and	  diversity	  yet	  have	  relatively	  weak	  phylogenetic	  and	  cultural	  diffusion	  relationships	  to	  one	  another	  
(thus	   avoiding	   “Galton’s	   problem”,	   whereby	   cross-­‐cultural	   comparisons	   can	   generate	   spurious	  
correlations	  if	  common	  attributes	  have	  been	  transmitted	  between	  societies	  or	  are	  descended	  from	  a	  
common	   ancestor)	   (Johnson,	   2005).	   The	   database	   contains	   quantitative	   variables	   describing	  
numerous	   characteristics	   of	   the	   societies	   in	   the	   sample.	   The	   “high	   gods”	   variable	   is	   defined	   by	  
Murdock	  (1967,	  p.	  52)	  as	  “a	  spiritual	  being	  who	  is	  believed	  to	  have	  created	  all	  reality	  and/or	  to	  be	  its	  
ultimate	  governor,	  even	  though	  his	  sole	  act	  was	  to	  create	  other	  spirits	  who,	  in	  turn,	  created	  or	  control	  
the	  natural	  world”.	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In	  any	  case,	  as	  Graham	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  argue,	  foundationhood	  does	  not	  require	  that	  the	  
foundation	  in	  question	  be	  shown	  to	  underlie	  relevant	  cultural	  representations	  in	  all	  
human	  cultures.	  Cultural	   influences	  may	   restrict	   the	  expression	  of	   innate	  cognitive	  
tendencies,	   just	   as	   they	   can	   restrict	   the	   expression	   of	   innate	   physical	   propensities	  
(e.g.,	   foot	   binding	   in	   Imperial	   China	   restricted	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   feet;	   Ko,	   2002).	  
However,	   Graham	   and	   colleagues	   also	   note	   that	   not	   all	   cultures	   are	   equally	  
informative	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  establishing	   foundationhood.	   In	  particular,	   the	  most	  
informative	  societies	  are	  those	  most	  closely	  resembling	  relevant	  ancestral	   lifestyles	  
(Tooby	  &	  Cosmides,	  1990,	  1992;	  see	  Marlowe,	  2005).	  And	   it	   is	   in	   these	  small-­‐scale	  
hunter-­‐gatherer	   societies	   that	   explicit	   doctrines	   about	   moralizing,	   punitive	  
supernatural	   agents	   are	   conspicuously	   absent	   (Baumard	   &	   Boyer,	   2013a;	   Boehm,	  
2008;	  Boyer,	  2001).	  For	  example,	  the	  Hadza	  of	  northern	  Tanzania	  and	  the	  ǃKung	  of	  
the	  Kalahari	  Desert	  are	  contemporary	  hunter-­‐gatherer	  societies	  with	  gods	  who	  take	  
little	  interest	  in	  human	  wrong-­‐doing	  (Norenzayan,	  2013).	  
	  
In	  our	  judgment,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  our	  evolved	  cognitive	  systems	  produce	  
stable	   intuitions	   about	   omnipresent	   supernatural	   punishers.	  What	   we	   think	   more	  
plausible	   is	   that	  we	  have	  a	  genetically	  endowed	  sensitivity	   to	   situational	   cues	   that	  
our	  behavior	  is	  being	  observed.	  Experiments	  demonstrate	  that	  people	  –	  even	  young	  
children	  -­‐	  are	  “strategically	  prosocial”,	  behaving	  more	  generously	  and	  cooperatively	  
when	   they	   know	   others	   can	   observe	   their	   behaviour	   (e.g.,	   Gächter	   &	   Fehr,	   1999;	  
Leimgruber,	  Shaw,	  Santos	  &	  Olson,	  2012;	  Wedekind	  &	  Milinski,	  2000).	  A	  burgeoning	  
literature	  indicates	  that	  even	  very	  subtle	  cues	  of	  surveillance	  influence	  adherence	  to	  
prevailing	   moral	   norms.	   For	   example,	   Haley	   and	   Fessler	   (2005)	   found	   that	   the	  
presence	  of	  stylized	  eye-­‐like	  images	  on	  the	  computer	  background	  had	  a	  substantial	  
influence	  on	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  who,	  under	  conditions	  of	  strict	  anonymity,	  
allocated	  money	  to	  another	  individual	  in	  a	  computerised	  dictator	  game	  (nearly	  80%	  
of	  participants	  in	  the	  “eyespots”	  conditions	  transferred	  money,	  compared	  with	  just	  
over	   50%	   in	   conditions	   without	   eyespots).	   Rigdon,	   Ishii,	   Watabe,	   and	   Kitayama	  
(2009)	   replicated	   this	   experimental	   result	   using	   three	   dots	   in	   a	   schematic	   face	  
configuration,	   compared	   to	   a	   condition	   in	   which	   this	   configuration	   was	   reversed	  
vertically	  (see	  also	  Baillon,	  Selim	  &	  van	  Dolder,	  2013;	  Burnham	  &	  Hare,	  2007;	  Oda,	  
Niwa,	   Honma	   &	   Hiraishi,	   2011;	   cf.	   Fehr	   &	   Schneider,	   2010).	   In	   contrast	   to	   these	  
studies,	  Raihani	  and	  Bshary	   (2012)	   found	   that	  dictators	  donated	   less	  money	   in	   the	  
presence	  of	  eye	  images.	  However,	  these	  authors	  only	  analysed	  mean	  donations,	  and	  
not	   the	  probability	  of	  donating	  something	   (however	  small).	  Nettle,	  Harper,	  Kidson,	  
Stone,	  Penton-­‐Voak	  &	  Bateson	   (2013)	  argue	   that	   the	   reliable	  effect	  of	   surveillance	  
cues	   in	   the	   dictator	   game	   is	   to	   increase	   the	   probability	   that	   dictators	   will	   donate	  
something,	  rather	  than	  to	   increase	  mean	  donations.	  A	  re-­‐analysis	  by	  these	  authors	  
of	  Raihani	  &	  Bshary’s	  (2012)	  data	  confirmed	  the	  former	  effect.	  
	  
Bateson,	  Nettle	  and	  colleagues	  have	  found	  similar	  effects	  using	  an	  image	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  
eyes	   on	   a	   notice	   in	   naturalistic	   settings.	   Bateson,	   Nettle,	   &	   Roberts	   (2006)	   found	  
that,	  compared	  to	  images	  of	  flowers,	  eye	  images	  substantially	  increased	  the	  level	  of	  
contributions	  to	  an	  honesty	  box	  in	  a	  psychology	  department	  tea	  room;	  and	  Ernest-­‐
Jones,	  Nettle	  &	  Bateson	  (2011)	  found	  that	  similar	  images	  halved	  the	  odds	  of	  littering	  
in	  a	  university	  cafeteria.	  Bourrat,	  Baumard	  and	  McKay	  (2011)	  found	  that	  such	  images	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led	   to	   greater	   condemnation	   of	   moral	   infractions.	   Relatedly,	   Cavrak	   and	   Kleider-­‐
Offutt	  (2014)	  recently	  found	  that	  participants	  exposed	  to	  religious	  images	  associated	  
with	  a	  prominent	  supernatural	  agent	  (e.g.,	  a	  crucifix,	  a	  crown	  of	  thorns,	  a	  Jesus	  Fish	  
or	   Ichthys)	   rated	   morally	   ambiguous	   actions	   as	   less	   morally	   appropriate	   than	   did	  
participants	  exposed	  to	  control	   images.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  experimental	  
cues	  of	  anonymity	  rather	  than	  of	  surveillance	  (e.g.,	  dimmed	  lighting,	  the	  wearing	  of	  
sunglasses)	   led	   to	  more	  moral	   infractions	   (Zhong,	   Bohns	  &	   Gino,	   2010).	   Tane	   and	  
Takezawa	  (2011)	  found	  that	  Haley	  and	  Fessler’s	  (2005)	  stylized	  eye-­‐like	  images	  had	  
no	   effect	   on	   dictator	   game	   allocations	  when	   the	   stimuli	  were	   presented	   in	   a	   dark	  
room.	  
	  
The	  upshot	  of	  all	  this	  work	  is	  that	  evolved	  agency-­‐detection	  mechanisms	  may	  serve	  
to	   deliver	   intuitions	   about	   observing	   agents	   and	   to	   regulate	   our	   behavior	   in	   the	  
presence	   of	   those	   agents.	   We	   doubt,	   however,	   that	   such	   mechanisms	   deliver	  
intuitions	  about	  moralizing,	  punitive	  supernatural	  agents	  –	  instead,	  we	  think	  that	  the	  
relevant	   intuitions	  are	  more	  basic	   (just	   concerning	   the	  presence	  of	  agency	  per	   se).	  
Triggered	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   any	   visible	   intentional	   agent,	   however,	   such	   intuitions	  
may	   be	   reflectively	   elaborated	   into	   conclusions	   about	   supernatural	   watchers	  
(Baumard	   &	   Boyer,	   2013b).	   And	   drawing	   on	   intuitions	   about	   fairness	   and	   the	  
psychological	  characteristics	  of	  intentional	  agents	  (ToM),	  such	  supernatural	  watcher	  
concepts	   may	   morph	   into	   more	   complex,	   compelling	   and	   culturally	   transmissible	  
notions	  of	  moralizing	  Gods	   -­‐	   notions	  which,	  when	  made	   salient	  or	   activated	   (as	   in	  
priming	  studies),	  serve	  to	  promote	  adherence	  to	  the	  perceived	  norms	  of	  those	  Gods.	  
	  
Here	  we	  see	  the	  essential	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  ‘religion’	  and	  ‘morality’	  categories,	  for	  
there	  may	  be	   considerable	  overlap	  between	   ‘religious’	   and	   ‘moral’	   features	   at	   the	  
levels	   of	   both	   cognitive	  predispositions	   and	   cultural	   representations.	  After	   all,	   it	   is	  
clear	   that	   cultural	   representations	   of	   morally	   concerned,	   punitive	   supernatural	  
agents	   -­‐	   ‘moralising	  Gods’	   (Roes	  &	  Raymond,	  2003)	   -­‐	  are	  both	  religious	  and	  moral.	  
Moreover,	   the	   notion	   that	   cultural	   notions	   of	   such	   Gods	   are	   undergirded	   by	  
cognitive	  intuitions	  about	  agency,	  ToM	  and	  fairness	  (or	  ‘proportionality’;	  Baumard	  &	  
Boyer,	  2013a)	  is	  not	  just	  plausible	  but	  compelling.	  
	  
What	   this	   highlights	   is	   that	   we	   can	   often	  make	   no	   principled	   distinction	   between	  
religion	  and	  morality	  at	  the	   level	  of	  culture	  or	  cognition.	  Our	  aim	  here	  has	  been	  to	  
pinpoint	  some	  of	  the	  major	  features	  in	  the	  religious	  and	  moral	  constellations.	  Where	  
we	   play	   the	   astrologer’s	   game,	   in	   considering	   the	   biological	   and	   cultural	   interplay	  
between	  certain	  –	  essentially	  arbitrary	  –	  sets	  of	  these	  features,	  we	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  
engage	   and	   accommodate	   our	   academic	   colleagues.	   Ultimately,	   however,	   we	   see	  
evolved	  cognitive	  systems	  for	  care,	  fairness,	   loyalty,	  respect	  and	  purity	  as	  ‘religious	  
foundations’	   no	   less	   than	   as	   ‘moral	   foundations.’	   A	   thoroughgoing	   science	   of	  
‘religion’	   and	   ‘morality’	   may	   ultimately	   dispense	   with	   these	   terms,	   exhaustively	  
mapping	   the	   relations	   between	   evolved	   cognitive	   systems	   and	   cultural	  
representations	  without	  recourse	  to	  vague	  overarching	  labels.	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Recall	  the	  analogy	  drawn	  above	  between	  the	  properties	  of	  (a)	  hands	  and	  gloves	  and	  
(b)	  evolved	  cognitive	   systems	  and	  explicit	   cultural	   representations.	  Whereas	  hands	  
are	   biologically	   evolved	   features	   of	   human	   anatomy,	   gloves	   are	   culturally	   evolved	  
artifacts	  that	  must	  follow	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  hand	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  order	  
to	   be	   wearable.	   In	   this	   section	   we	   ask	   whether,	   in	   a	   similar	   fashion,	   culturally	  
evolved	  belief	   systems	  must	   follow	   the	  contours	  of	  our	  evolved	  cognitive	   systems.	  
Moreover,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   our	   concern	   with	   the	   religion-­‐morality	  
relationship,	  do	  cultural	  systems	  create	  durable	  connections	  between	  the	  moral	  and	  
religious	   foundations	   depicted	   in	   Figure	   2?	   Do	   religious	   cultural	   representations	  
influence	  the	  prevalence	  of	  moral	  cultural	  representations	  and/or	  do	  they	  constrain	  
the	   activation	   of	  moral	   intuitions?	   In	   posing	   these	   particular	   questions	   we	   do	   not	  
mean	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   direction	   of	   causality	   must	   always	   run	   from	   religion	   to	  
morality.	   It	   could	   be	   that	   ‘moral’	   cultural	   representations	   amplify	   or	   constrain	   the	  
activation	  of	  ‘religious’	  intuitions.	  For	  example,	  a	  sign	  in	  a	  public	  restroom	  designed	  
to	   encourage	   hand	   washing	   by	   reminding	   people	   of	   a	   behavioural	   norm	   (‘Is	   the	  
person	   next	   to	   you	   washing	   with	   soap?’)	   may	   trigger	   intuitions	   about	   observing	  
agents	  (Judah,	  Aunger,	  Schmidt,	  Michie,	  Granger	  &	  Curtis,	  2009).	  
	  
In	   considering	   these	   questions,	   one	   might	   seek	   to	   supplement	   the	   examples	   in	  
Figure	   2	   with	   further	   examples	   plucked	   from	   the	   ethnographic	   record.	   Although	  
time-­‐consuming,	  such	  an	  exercise	  would	  undoubtedly	  be	  instructive	  in	  many	  ways.	  It	  
would	   indicate,	   for	   example,	   whether	   –	   and	   how	   –	   cultural	   systems	   from	   diverse	  
regions	  of	  the	  world	  are	  capable	  of	  connecting	  moral	  and	  religious	  foundations	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  ways.	  It	  would	  not,	  however,	  address	  the	  deeper	  question	  of	  why	  they	  do	  
so.	   To	   examine	   the	   ‘how’	   question	   we	   provide	   a	   case	   study	   based	   on	   long-­‐term	  
immersion	   in	   a	   particular	   cultural	   system.	   To	   examine	   the	   ‘why’	   question	   we	  
consider	  two	  competing	  perspectives:	  a	  cultural	  adaptationist	  account	  and	  a	  cultural	  
epidemiological	  one.	  
	  
The	   Pomio	   Kivung:	   A	   Case	   Study	   in	   Culturally	   Evolved	   Connections	   Between	  
Religious	  and	  Moral	  Foundations	  
To	   illustrate	  some	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  cultural	   systems	  may	  serve	   to	  connect	   the	  
fractionated	  elements	  of	  religion	  and	  morality	  (the	  ‘how’	  question)	  we	  consider	  here	  
a	   cargo	  cult	   in	  East	  New	  Britain	  Province,	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  known	  as	   the	  Pomio	  
Kivung	  (Whitehouse,	  1995).	  In	  Tok	  Pisin	  (the	  lingua	  franca	  of	  PNG),	  the	  word	  ‘Kivung’	  
means	   ‘a	  meeting’	  or	   ‘to	  meet’	  but	   for	  several	  ethnic	  groups	   in	  New	  Britain	   it	  also	  
designates	   a	   popular	   religious	   movement.	   Established	   in	   the	   early	   1960s	   and	  
spreading	  to	  encompass	  scores	  of	  villages	  in	  some	  of	  the	  more	  remote	  regions	  of	  the	  
island,	   the	   movement	   has	   a	   centralized	   leadership,	   based	   at	   a	   large	   coastal	  
settlement,	   from	  which	  regular	  patrols	   to	  outlying	  villages	  are	  sent:	  bringing	  news,	  
collecting	   taxes,	   and	   policing	   the	   orthodoxy.	   Each	   Kivung	   village	   has	   a	   team	   of	  
designated	   orators,	   trained	   at	   the	   movement’s	   headquarters,	   charged	   with	   the	  
responsibility	  of	  preaching	  a	  standard	  body	  of	  doctrines	  and	  overseeing	  a	  wide	  range	  
of	  authorized	  rituals.	  The	  mainstream	  Kivung	  exhibits	  all	   the	  fractionated	  elements	  
of	  our	   intuitive	   religious	   repertoire:	  hyperactive	  agency	  detection,	  Theory	  of	  Mind,	  
teleofunctional	  reasoning,	  the	  ritual	  stance,	  and	  group	  psychology.	  And	   it	  connects	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each	  of	  these	  elements	  to	  our	  five	  moral	  foundations	  (care,	  fairness,	  loyalty,	  respect,	  
and	  purity).	  
	  
At	   the	   heart	   of	   Kivung	   teachings	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   ancestors	   of	   followers	   will	  
someday	  soon	  return	  from	  the	  dead,	  bringing	  with	  them	  all	  the	  wonders	  of	  Western	  
technology.	   Until	   that	   day,	   however,	   the	   ancestors	   exist	   only	   as	   bodiless	   agents,	  
discernible	  by	  the	  sounds	  they	  make	  and	  the	  traces	  they	  leave	  behind.	  The	  ancestors	  
are	   believed	   to	  mill	   around	   with	   the	   living	   as	   they	   go	   about	   their	   daily	   activities,	  
invisibly	   observing	   people’s	   comings	   and	   goings	   and	   taking	   a	   particular	   interest	   in	  
the	  moral	   implications	  of	  their	  behavior.	  Failures	  to	  observe	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  Kivung	  
are	   said	   to	   delay	   the	   miracle	   of	   returning	   ancestors.	   Only	   when	   a	   certain	   moral	  
threshold	  has	   been	   achieved	  will	   the	   living	   and	   the	  dead	  be	   reunited.	   This	   dogma	  
connects	  with	  all	  our	  moral	  foundations	  because	  the	  Kivung	  laws,	  adapted	  from	  the	  
Ten	  Commandments	  as	  taught	  by	  Catholic	  missionaries	   in	  the	  region,	  forbid	  such	  a	  
broad	   range	   of	   transgressions	   as	   violence	   and	   slander	   (harming),	   cheating	   and	  
stealing	  (fairness),	  criticizing	  the	  Kivung	  (loyalty),	  disobedience	  (respect)	  and	  cooking	  
during	  the	  menses	  (purity).	  
	  
Kivung	   ideas	  about	  ancestors	  not	  only	   link	  up	  our	  moral	   foundations	  but	   they	  also	  
weave	   intricate	   connections	   through	   discourse	   and	   ritual	   between	   each	   of	   our	  
religious	   foundations.	   For	   example,	   among	   the	   many	   rituals	   observed	   by	   Kivung	  
followers	  is	  the	  daily	  laying	  out	  of	  food	  offerings	  to	  the	  ancestors.	  Great	  attention	  is	  
paid	  to	  the	  noises	  of	  ancestors	  entering	  the	  temple	  (e.g.	  the	  creaking	  of	  the	  door),	  
tampering	  with	  the	  food	  (e.g.	  the	  clattering	  of	  dishes)	  and	  the	  visible	  signs	  of	  eating	  
(e.g.	  morsels	  of	  food	  apparently	  removed	  by	  invisible	  hands).	  These	  ideas	  obviously	  
prime	   agency	   detection	   –	   moreover,	   there	   is	   a	   specialist	   (whose	   official	   role	  
translates	  roughly	  as	  ‘witness’)	  charged	  with	  responsibility	  for	  observing	  vigils	  in	  the	  
temples	   and	   listening	   for	   signs	  of	   invisible	   ancestral	   presence.	  Insofar	   as	   ancestors	  
are	   said	   to	   be	   able	   to	   see	   into	   people’s	   hearts	   and	  minds	   Kivung	   dogma	   presents	  
formidable	  Theory	  of	  Mind	  challenges	  and	  a	  suite	  of	  rituals	  dedicated	  to	  assuaging	  
feelings	  of	   guilt	   and	   shame	  as	  well	   as	   the	  pursuit	  of	   forgiveness	  and	  absolution.	  A	  
common	  way	  of	  paying	  for	  one's	  sins	  to	  is	  place	  money	  into	  a	  special	  receptacle	  or	  
(since	  not	  all	  Kivung	  followers	  have	  access	  to	  money)	  to	  place	  one's	  hand	  over	  the	  
receptacle	   to	   display	   the	   intention	   to	   give.	   This	   simple	   ritual	   requires	   intense	  
concentration	  since	   it	   is	   said	   that	   if	   the	  ancestors	  detect	   insincerity	   (telepathically)	  
they	   will	   withhold	   their	   forgiveness.	   Teleofunctional	   reasoning	   meanwhile	   is	   a	  
pervasive	   feature	   of	   Kivung	   origin	   myths	   and	   various	   rituals	   associated	   with	   the	  
sacred	   gardens	   (one	   of	   which	   memorializes	   a	   Melanesian	   Eden).	   And	   lastly,	   the	  
Kivung	   activates	   group	   psychology	   by	   creating	   familial	   ties	   based	   on	   shared	   ritual	  
experiences	   and	   coalitional	   bonds	   via	   us-­‐them	   thinking	   in	   relation	   to	   external	  
detractors	  and	  critics.	  
	  
Although	  the	  Kivung	  connects	  up	  all	  our	  moral	  and	  religious	  foundations	  through	  a	  
highly	  elaborated	  system	  of	  doctrines	  and	  practices,	  many	  of	  which	  borrow	  liberally	  
from	  missionary	   teachings,	  we	   cannot	   assume	   that	   the	   same	  would	   be	   true	   of	   all	  
cultural	  systems	  typically	  classified	  as	  ‘religious’.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  anthropologists	  
to	  establish	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	   In	   the	  end,	  however,	   it	   constitutes	  a	  question	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about	  how	  rather	  than	  why	  cultural	  systems	  create	  connections	  between	  moral	  and	  
religious	   foundations.	   To	   address	   the	  why,	  we	  need	   to	   consider	   issues	   of	   function	  
and	  ultimate	  causation.	  
	  
Adaptationist	  And	  Byproduct	  Accounts	  
Two	  contrasting	  positions	  on	  the	  why	  of	  the	  morality-­‐religion	  relationship	  in	  cultural	  
evolution	  have	   achieved	   some	  prominence	   in	   recent	   years.	  One	   takes	   the	   form	  of	  
adaptationist	  arguments	  concerning	  the	  emergence	  and	  spread	  of	  routinized	  rituals	  
and	  moralizing	  gods.	  The	  other	  argues	  that	  all	  cultural	  traditions,	  however	  they	  trace	  
(or	   fail	   to	   trace)	   the	   connections	  between	  moral	   and	   religious	   foundations	  are	  by-­‐
products	   of	   cognitive	   predispositions	   and	   biases	   rather	   than	   cultural	   adaptations	  
that	  enhance	  the	  fitness	  of	  individuals	  or	  groups.	  We	  briefly	  review	  these	  alternative	  
positions	  and	  consider	  what	  evidence	  would	  be	  required	  to	  adjudicate	  satisfactorily	  
between	  the	  two.	  	  
	  
Scholars	   in	   the	   cognitive	   science	   of	   religion	   tend	   to	   agree	   that	  many	   globally	   and	  
historically	  recurrent	  features	  of	  religious	  thinking	  and	  behaviour	  are	  by-­‐products	  of	  
cognitive	  machinery	  that	  evolved	  for	  reasons	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  religion	  
(e.g.,	   Atran,	   2002;	   Atran	  &	  Norenzayan,	   2004;	   Barrett,	   2004;	   Bloom,	   2009;	   Boyer,	  
2001).	   For	   example,	   HADDs	   are	   thought	   to	   have	   evolved	   to	   help	   support	   the	  
detection	   of	   predators	   and	   prey.	   If	   they	   also	   undergirded	   intuitions	   about	   the	  
presence	   of	   bodiless	   agents	   then	   this	   was	   originally	   a	   side-­‐effect	   (by-­‐product)	   of	  
their	  main	  function	  (Barrett,	  2000,	  2004,	  2012).	  To	  express	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  body-­‐
clothing	  analogy,	  if	  HADDs	  were	  equivalent	  to	  the	  evolved	  anatomy	  of	  the	  hand	  then	  
the	   accumulated	   cultural	   knowledge	   of	   expert	   trackers	   and	   hunters	   would	   be	  
equivalent	   to	   the	   protective	   functions	   of	   gloves,	   essential	   for	   survival	   in	   very	   cold	  
climates.	  But	  gloves	  can	  also	  have	  decorative	  frills,	  like	  bobbles	  and	  tassels	  that	  have	  
no	   particular	   survival	   value.	   Cultural	   representations	   concerning	   bodiless	   agents	  
would	  be	  decorative	  frills	  of	  this	  kind.	  As	  such	  these	  kinds	  of	  functionally	  superfluous	  
additions	   need	   not	   follow	   the	   contour	   of	   the	   hand	   at	   all	   –	   and	  might	   derive	   their	  
popular	  appeal	  precisely	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  not.	  Thus,	  one	  of	  the	  dominant	  
explanations	  for	  the	  cultural	  recurrence	  of	  supernatural	  agent	  concepts	  is	  that	  they	  
violate	   intuitive	   expectations	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   especially	   attention	   grabbing	   and	  
memorable	  –	  like	  glittering	  jewels	  adorning	  the	  gauntlet	  of	  an	  emperor	  (Boyer,	  2001;	  
Pyysiäinen,	  2001).	  Conceivably,	   the	  cultural	  success	  of	  certain	  Christian	   ideals	   (e.g.,	  
‘turning	   the	   other	   cheek’)	  may	   owe	   in	   part	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   violate	   intuitions	  
about	  proportionality	  (‘an	  eye	  for	  an	  eye’).	  
	  
What	   distinguishes	   the	   adaptationist	   perspective	   on	   religion,	   however,	   is	   the	   view	  
that	  at	   least	   some	  of	   these	   religious	  by-­‐products	  became	  useful	   for	   the	  survival	  of	  
individuals	   and	   groups	   in	   the	   course	   of	   cultural	   evolution.	   Most	   commonly	   this	  
argument	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  the	  growth	  of	   large-­‐scale	  societies.	  Humans	  evolved	  
to	   live	   in	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   bands	   of	   hunter-­‐gatherers	   rather	   than	   in	   vast	   empires	   or	  
nations.	  Small	  group	  psychology,	  it	  has	  been	  argued,	  would	  have	  been	  insufficient	  to	  
handle	   many	   of	   the	   challenges	   of	   large	   group	   living.	   Religion	   provided	   cultural	  
adaptations	   to	   support	   the	   transition	   from	   foraging	   to	   farming,	   from	   local	  
community	  to	  state	  formation.	  One	  line	  of	  adaptationist	  thinking	  has	  focused	  on	  the	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role	   of	   ritual	   frequency	   in	   this	   transition	   (Whitehouse,	   2012).	   As	   collective	   rituals	  
came	  to	  be	  performed	  more	   regularly	  beliefs	  and	  practices	   that	  defined	   the	  group	  
could	  be	  standardized	  across	  larger	  populations,	  a	  tendency	  that	  was	  reinforced	  by	  
the	   invention	   of	   literacy	   (Mullins,	   Whitehouse	   &	   Atkinson,	   2013).	   As	   common	  
identity	   markers	   came	   to	   unite	   ever	   larger	   coalitions,	   local	   communities	   bound	  
together	  by	  small	  group	  psychology	   tended	  to	  be	  engulfed	  and	  absorbed	  or	  wiped	  
out	  altogether	  (Turchin,	  Whitehouse,	  Francois,	  Slingerland	  &	  Collard,	  2012).	  Another	  
line	  of	  adaptationist	  thinking	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  of	  rituals	  as	  costly	  signals	  and	  
‘credibility	   enhancing	   displays’.	   Still	   another	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   role	   of	  moralizing	  
gods	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  social	  complexity.	  We	  consider	  each	  of	  these	  approaches	  in	  
turn.	  
	  
Routinisation.	  One	  of	   the	  major	   challenges	   in	   understanding	  how	  and	  why	  
religion	   changes	   as	   societies	   become	   larger	   and	   more	   complex	   relates	   to	   the	  
changing	   structure	  and	   function	  of	   ritual.	  As	   conditions	  permitted	  an	  escalation	  of	  
the	   scale	   and	   complexity	   of	   human	   societies,	   cultural	   evolutionary	   processes	  may	  
have	   further	   tuned	   the	   elements	   of	   ritual,	   promoting	   social	   cohesion.	   With	   the	  
evolution	  of	   social	   complexity,	   religious	   rituals	   become	  more	   routinized,	   dysphoric	  
rituals	  become	  less	  widespread,	  doctrine	  and	  narrative	  becomes	  more	  standardized,	  
beliefs	  become	  more	  universalistic,	  religion	  becomes	  more	  hierarchical,	  offices	  more	  
professionalized,	   sacred	   texts	   help	   to	   codify	   and	   legitimate	   emergent	   orthodoxies,	  
and	   religious	   guilds	   increasingly	   monopolize	   resources	   (Whitehouse,	   2000,	   2004).	  
Some	  of	   these	  patterns	  have	   recently	  been	  documented	  quantitatively	  using	   large	  
samples	  of	  religious	  traditions	  from	  the	  ethnographic	  record.	  For	  instance,	  Atkinson	  
and	   Whitehouse	   (2010)	   have	   shown	   that	   as	   societies	   become	   larger	   and	   more	  
hierarchical,	   rituals	  are	  more	  frequently	  performed	  (Atkinson	  &	  Whitehouse,	  2010)	  
and	   low-­‐frequency	  dysphoric	  rituals	  typical	  of	  small,	  cohesive	  social	  groups	  such	  as	  
warring	   tribes	   (Whitehouse,	   1996)	   come	   to	   be	   confined	   to	   specialised	   niches	   (e.g.	  
hazing	   and	   initiation	   in	   military	   organizations).	   Small	   tightly-­‐bonded	   groups	   with	  
dysphoric	   rituals	   may	   be	   generally	   deleterious	   to	   cooperation	   in	   larger	   societies	  
(creating	   opposing	   coalitions)	   and	   thus	   ‘selected	   out’	   of	   the	   cultural	   repertoire,	   at	  
least	   for	   the	   population	   at	   large,	   and	   relegated	   to	   confined	   organizations	   (e.g.	  
militaries).	   Instead,	   the	   much	   more	   frequent	   rituals	   typical	   of	   regional	   and	   world	  
religions	  sustain	  forms	  of	  group	  identification	  better	  suited	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  collective	  
action	  problems	  presented	  by	  interactions	  among	  strangers,	  or	  socially	  more	  distant	  
individuals	   (Whitehouse,	   2004).	   As	   rituals	   become	  more	   routinized,	   however,	   they	  
also	   become	   less	   stimulating	   emotionally,	   and	   perhaps	   even	   more	   tedious	  
(Whitehouse,	   2000).	   New	   rituals	   then	   evolved	   in	   some	   traditions	   to	   convey	  
propositional	   information	   about	   supernatural	   beliefs	   through	   a	   combination	   of	  
repetition	  and	  costly	  displays	  (such	  as	  animal	  sacrifices	  or	  monetary	  donations)	  that	  
culturally	   transmit	  commitment	   to	  certain	  beliefs	   (Henrich,	  2009;	  Atran	  &	  Henrich,	  
2010).	  As	  some	  societies	  became	  ever	  larger	  and	  more	  complex,	  even	  the	  processes	  
described	  above	  may	  not	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  sustain	  cooperation	  and	  a	  host	  of	  
new	   cultural	   adaptations,	  most	   notably	   forms	  of	   external	   information	   storage	   and	  
secular	   institutions	   of	   governance,	   became	   increasingly	   important	   (Mullins	   et	   al.,	  
2013;	  Norenzayan,	  2013).	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Costly	   signalling	   and	   ‘credibility-­‐enhancing	   displays’.	   ‘Costly	   signalling’	  
theorists	  have	  argued	   that	   rituals	   serve	   as	   a	  hard-­‐to-­‐fake	   index	  of	   commitment	   to	  
the	  group	  (Irons,	  2001).	  Although	  originally	  used	  by	  biologists	  to	  denote	  the	  display	  
of	  costly	  signals	  of	  fine	  health,	  such	  as	  the	  peacock’s	  tail	  or	  the	  leaping	  of	  springbok	  
(Grafen,	   1990;	   Zahavi	   &	   Zahavi,	   1997),	   applications	   of	   signalling	   theory	   to	   ritual	  
behaviour	   in	  humans	  adopt	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	   ‘costliness’	   -­‐	   in	  terms	  of	  time,	  
labour,	   money,	   goods,	   and	   health	   (Bulbulia,	   2008;	   for	   a	   critique	   see	   Murray	   &	  
Moore,	  2009).	  To	  avoid	  confusion	  with	  the	  narrower	  meaning	  of	  costly	  signalling	  in	  
biology,	   some	   social	   scientists	   prefer	   to	   talk	   of	   ‘commitment	   signalling’	   or	   ‘honest	  
signalling’	  (Bliege	  Bird	  &	  Smith,	  2005;	  Sosis	  &	  Alcorta,	  2003).	  With	  the	  emergence	  of	  
agriculture	   and	   larger,	   more	   complex	   social	   formations,	   strangers	   (or	   relative	  
strangers)	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  their	  respective	  reputational	  statuses	  where	  
biographical	   information	  was	   not	   readily	   available.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   rituals	  
provided	  a	  signal	  of	  good	  character	  (trustworthiness	  and	  willingness	  to	  cooperate)	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  specific	  information	  about	  other	  people’s	  personal	  histories	  (Bulbulia	  
et	  al.,	  2013).	  
	  
The	  signalling	  theory	  of	  religion	  and	  ritual	  has	  been	  recently	  extended	  by	  the	  theory	  
of	   ‘Credibility	  Enhancing	  Displays’	   (or	  CREDS;	  Henrich,	  2009).	  By	  engaging	   in	   costly	  
behaviours	  rather	  than	  merely	  advocating	  such	  behaviour	  in	  others	  (i.e.	  by	  ‘walking	  
the	  walk’	  as	  well	  as	  ‘talking	  the	  talk’),	  role	  models	  secure	  the	  trust	  and	  devotion	  of	  
followers.	   This	   is	   thought	   to	   facilitate	   the	   spread	   of	   moral	   norms	   across	   large	  
populations	  and	  safeguard	  their	  transmission	  across	  the	  generations.	  CREDS	  theory	  
seeks	   to	   explain	   not	   only	   the	   wide	   distribution	   of	   moral	   norms	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	  
‘ethical	  religions’	  but	  also	  the	  prevalence	  of	  moral	  exemplars	  in	  such	  traditions	  (e.g.,	  
gurus,	  prophets,	  priests,	  and	  messiahs)	  and	  the	  willingness	  of	  rulers	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  
the	  divine	  edicts.	  
	  
The	   cultural	   evolution	   of	   ‘moralising	   Gods’.	   One	   of	   the	   most	   vigorous	  
debates	  in	  the	  recent	  literature	  on	  religion	  and	  morality	  has	  concerned	  the	  cultural	  
prevalence	   of	   moralising	   Gods	   –	   powerful	   supernatural	   agents	   who	   monitor	  
behavior	   and	   punish	   moral	   infractions.	   Ara	   Norenzayan	   and	   colleagues	   (e.g.,	  
Norenzayan	   2013,	   in	   press;	   Norenzayan	   &	   Shariff,	   2008;	   Norenzayan,	   Shariff	   &	  
Gervais,	   2009;	   Shariff,	  Norenzayan	  &	  Henrich,	   2010)	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   cultural	  
innovation	   of	   notions	   of	   such	   gods	   over	   the	   last	   twelve	   millennia	   has	   been	   an	  
important	  factor	  in	  the	  human	  transition	  from	  small-­‐scale,	  kin-­‐based	  groups	  to	  large-­‐
scale	  societies.	  	  
	  
In	  small-­‐scale	  and	  traditional	  societies	  in	  which	  everybody	  knows	  everyone	  else	  and	  
most	   social	   behaviour	   is	   easily	   observed	   and	   reported,	   transgressions	   are	   easily	  
detected.	   Modern	   technologies	   of	   surveillance,	   such	   as	   police	   cameras,	   identity	  
cards,	   and	   computer	   records	   allow	   increasingly	   extensive	   monitoring	   of	   thieves,	  
cheats,	  defectors,	  and	  free	  riders	  by	  designated	  authorities.	  But	  for	  several	  thousand	  
years,	   during	   which	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘ethical	   religions’	   evolved,	   much	   of	   the	   world’s	  
population	   has	   lived	   in	   relatively	   complex	   societies,	   where	   interactions	   with	  
strangers	   were	   common	   and	   parasitic	   free	   riders	   could	   evade	   punishment	   by	  
wearing	   the	   cloak	   of	   anonymity.	   According	   to	   Norenzayan	   and	   colleagues,	   the	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postulation	  of	  moralizing	  Gods	  provided	  an	  ‘eye	  in	  the	  sky’	  (Gervais	  &	  Norenzayan,	  
2012a),	   curtailing	   the	   deleterious	   effects	   of	   freeriders	   and	   cheats	   and	   allowing	  
groups	  with	  such	  Gods	  to	  survive	  and	  prosper,	   in	  turn	  enhancing	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  
relevant	   God	   notions.	   Norenzayan	   et	   al’s	   theory	   is	   thus	   (cultural)	   adaptationist	   in	  
nature,	  as	  it	  claims	  that	  the	  cultural	  success	  of	  moralizing	  God	  concepts	  is	  due	  in	  part	  
to	  the	  adaptive	  effects	  of	  such	  concepts	  on	  human	  groups.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  Baumard	  and	  Boyer	  (2013a)	  argue	  incisively	  that	  the	  cultural	  prevalence	  
of	   moralizing	   God	   representations	   does	   not	   result	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   such	  
representations	   promote	   socially	   cohesive	   behaviours	   among	   human	   groups.	  
Instead,	   these	   representations	   are	   successful	   because	   they	   have	   features	   (e.g.,	  
resonance	  with	  stable	  intuitions	  about	  proportionality	  and	  with	  elaborated	  intuitions	  
about	   invisible	  agency)	   that	  render	  them	  especially	  attention-­‐grabbing,	  memorable	  
and	   transmissible.	   In	   short,	  moralizing	  Gods	   are	   cultural	   variants	  with	   effects	   that	  
enhance	  their	  own	  success	   (and	  so	  are	  adaptive	   in	   that	  sense;	  Dennett,	  1995),	  but	  
these	   effects	   do	   not	   include	   changes	   in	   the	   biological	   or	   cultural	   fitness	   of	   their	  
human	  vectors.	  
	  
How	  are	  we	   to	  evaluate	   these	  opposing	   views?	  One	   feature	  of	  Norenzayan	  et	   al’s	  
position	   is	   that	   it	   seems	   to	   entail	   that	   supernatural	   agent	   representations	   should	  
promote	  moral	   behaviours	   in	   the	   relevant	   cultures.	   As	  we	   have	   seen,	   a	  wealth	   of	  
evidence	  from	  priming	  studies	  indicates	  that	  the	  activation	  of	  supernatural	  concepts	  
can	  promote	  adherence	  to	  moral	  norms.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  other	  priming	  studies	  
have	  revealed	  “nonprosocial”	  effects	  of	  religious	  primes	  (Galen,	  2012).	  Do	  the	  latter	  
studies	  undermine	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  Norenzayan	  and	  colleagues?	  
	  
In	   our	   view,	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   “prosocial”	   and	   “nonprosocial”	   effects	   of	  
religious	  primes	  may	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	   sanitized	  conception	  of	   “prosociality”.	  
The	   contention	   of	   Norenzayan	   and	   colleagues	   is	   that	   the	   cultural	   success	   of	  
‘moralizing	  gods’	  owes	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  members	  of	  groups	  with	  beliefs	  in	  such	  gods	  
engage	   in	   behaviours	   that	   allow	   those	   groups	   to	   become	   larger	   and	   larger	   –	   that	  
favour	  their	  “stability,	  survival,	  and	  expansion,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  less	  successful	  rivals”	  
(Norenzayan,	  2013,	  p.	  30).	  Such	  behaviours	  are	  literally	  “pro-­‐social”,	  but	  we	  should	  
not	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  ‘prosocial’	  in	  the	  sanitized	  social	  psychological	  sense.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	   they	   may	   be	   aggressive,	   murderous,	   and	   even	   genocidal.	   Activating	   the	  
notion	  of	  moralising	  supernatural	  agents	  should	  encourage	  behaviours	  that	  advance	  
the	   interests	  of	  the	   ingroup,	  whether	  these	  behaviours	  are	   ‘nice’	  or	   ‘nasty’.	  Where	  
priming	  with	  God	  concepts	  promotes	  altruism,	  we	  should	  expect	  this	  altruism	  to	  be	  
parochial	   (confined	  to	  the	   ingroup)	  rather	  than	   indiscriminate	  (Hartung,	  1995),	  and	  
we	   should	   not	   be	   surprised	   if	   behaviours	   are	   undertaken	   to	   damage	   relevant	  
outgroups	   (Blogowska	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   De	   Dreu	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   In	   short,	   attempts	   to	  
substantiate	   Norenzayan’s	   theory	   with	   evidence	   of	   “religious	   prosociality”	   (the	  
sanitised	  kind)	  may	  be	  misguided.	  
	  
The	   pattern	   of	   “prosocial”	   and	   “nonprosocial”	   findings	   that	   has	   emerged	   from	  
priming	  studies	  to	  date	  is	  quite	  consistent	  with	  Norenzayan’s	  theory.	   It	   is	   less	  clear	  
that	   these	   findings	   are	   consistent	   with	   Baumard	   and	   Boyer	   (2013a).	   The	   latter	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authors	   claim	   that	   the	   success	   of	   moralising	   God	   concepts	   is	   entirely	   due	   to	   the	  
resonance	   of	   these	   concepts	  with	   the	   output	   of	   intuitive	   systems,	   so	   their	   theory	  
does	  not	  require	  that	  these	  concepts	  have	  any	  effects	  whatsoever	  on	  behaviour.	  Any	  
such	  effects	  are	  incidental	  and	  superfluous	  from	  their	  perspective.	  
	  
In	  making	   their	   case,	   Baumard	   and	  Boyer	   argue	   that	   the	   gods	  of	  many	  prominent	  
historical	  large-­‐scale	  societies	  were	  “strikingly	  non-­‐moral”:	  
	  
To	   simplify	   somewhat,	   the	   Romans,	   with	   their	   non-­‐moralizing	   gods,	   built	   one	   of	   history’s	  
most	  successful	  predatory	  empires.	  They	  then	  converted	  to	  Christianity,	  a	  moralizing	  religion,	  
and	   were	   promptly	   crushed	   by	   barbarians	   with	   tribal,	   non-­‐moralizing	   gods.	   (Baumard	   &	  
Boyer,	  2013a,	  p.	  276)	  
	  
Baumard	  and	  Boyer	  thus	  argue	  that	  moralizing	  religions	  were	  not	  the	  “magic	  bullet”	  
enabling	   the	   formation	   of	   large-­‐scale	   societies.	   A	   potential	   limitation	   of	   their	  
formulation,	   however,	   is	   that	   they	   appear	   to	   identify	   gods	   as	   “non-­‐moralizing”	   if	  
those	  gods	  are	  not	  explicitly	   represented	  as	   caring	  about	  human	  morality.	  As	   they	  
acknowledge,	   however,	   the	   gods	   of	   antiquity	  were	   represented	   as	  monitoring	   the	  
appropriate	  performance	  of	  rituals.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  rituals	  represent	  or	  promote	  
moral	   behaviours	   (see	   above),	   therefore,	   Gods	   that	   care	   about	   rituals	   care	   about	  
morality,	  directly	  or	  indirectly.	  We	  note	  in	  this	  connection	  that	  common	  components	  
of	   ritual	   performance	   may	   facilitate	   parochially	   altruistic	   behaviours,	   including	  
aggression	  (e.g.,	  Wiltermuth,	  2012,	  has	  recently	  shown	  that	  participants	  who	  acted	  
in	  synchrony	  with	  a	  confederate	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  confederate's	  
request	   to	   administer	   a	   blast	   of	   noise	   to	   other	   participants	   than	   were	   control	  
participants).	   In	   sum,	   in	   our	   view	   a	   full	   evaluation	   of	   cultural	   evolutionary	  
hypotheses	   about	   the	   connection	   between	   religion	   and	   morality	   requires	  
reorientation	  on	  at	  least	  two	  fronts:	  what	  is	  important	  is	  that	  notions	  of	  the	  relevant	  
Gods	  promote	  socially	  cohesive	  behaviours,	  not	  that	  the	  behaviours	  are	   ‘nice’,	  and	  




The	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	   morality	   is	   a	   deep	   and	   emotive	   topic.	   The	  
confident	  pronouncements	  of	  public	  commentators	  belie	  the	  bewildering	  theoretical	  
and	   methodological	   complexity	   of	   the	   issues.	   In	   the	   scholarly	   sphere,	   progress	   is	  
frequently	   impeded	   by	   a	   series	   of	   prevailing	   conceptual	   limitations	   and	   lacunae.	  
Many	   contemporary	   investigations	   employ	   parochial	   conceptions	   of	   ‘religion’	   and	  
‘morality’,	  fail	  to	  decompose	  these	  categories	  into	  theoretically	  grounded	  elements,	  
and/or	  neglect	  to	  consider	  the	  complex	  interplay	  between	  cognition	  and	  culture.	  The	  
tendency	  to	  adopt	  a	  sanitized	  conception	  of	  prosocial	  behavior	  has	  hampered	  efforts	  
to	  test	  theories	  of	  the	  extraordinary	  cultural	  dominance	  of	  ‘moralizing	  god’	  concepts	  
–	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  behaviours	  that	  allow	  religious	  groups	  to	  survive	  and	  expand	  may	  
be	  anything	  but	  ‘nice’.	  
	  
We	  have	  set	  out	  an	  encompassing	  evolutionary	   framework	  within	  which	   to	  situate	  
and	  evaluate	  relevant	  evidence.	  Our	  view	  is	  that	  cultural	  representations	  –	  concepts,	  
dogmas,	   artefacts,	   and	   practices	   both	   prescribed	   and	   proscribed	   –	   are	   triggered,	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shaped	   and	   constrained	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   foundational	   cognitive	   systems.	   We	   have	  
sought	   to	   identify	   the	   most	   currently	   plausible	   conjectures	   about	   biologically	  
evolved	  connections	  between	  these	  systems,	  and	  have	  reviewed	  and	  evaluated	  the	  
most	  prominent	  published	  debates	   in	  the	  cultural	  evolutionary	  domain.	  Ultimately,	  
we	   see	   and	   foresee	   no	   pithily	   characterisable	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	  
morality.	   First,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   terms	   ‘religion’	   and	   ‘morality’	   are	   largely	  
arbitrary	   and	   do	   not	   refer	   to	   coherent	   natural	   structures	   (as	  we	   have	   suggested),	  
efforts	   to	   establish	   connections	   between	   religion	   and	   morality,	   conceived	   as	  
monolithic	  entities,	  are	  destined	  to	  be	  facile	  or	  circular	  (or	  both).	  Second,	  under	  the	  
pluralistic	  approach	  we	  advocate,	  which	  fractionates	  both	  religion	  and	  morality	  and	  
distinguishes	  cognition	  from	  culture,	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  morality	  
expands	  into	  a	  matrix	  of	  separate	  relationships	  between	  fractionated	  elements.	  Thus	  
some	   aspects	   of	   ‘religion’	  may	   promote	   some	   aspects	   of	   ‘morality’	   just	   as	   others	  
serve	  to	  suppress	  or	  obstruct	  the	  same,	  or	  different,	  aspects.	  In	  short,	  in	  discussing	  
whether	   religion	   is	   a	   force	   for	   good	   we	   must	   be	   very	   clear	   what	   we	   mean	   by	  
‘religion’	  and	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  ‘good’.	  
	  
Although	   we	   eschew	   a	   simplistic	   story,	   we	   live	   in	   a	   very	   exciting	   time	   for	  
psychological	   research	   on	   this	   topic.	   A	   key	   avenue	   for	   future	   work	   is	   to	   establish	  
which	   biologically	   endowed	   cognitive	   structures	   and	   preferences	   are	   truly	  
foundational	   where	   ‘religion’	   and	   ‘morality’	   are	   concerned.	   The	   aim	   should	   be	   to	  
settle	   upon	   a	   parsimonious	   set	   of	   culturally	   and	   historically	   widespread	   cognitive	  
predispositions	   that	   exhibit	   developmental	   and	   comparative	   evidence	   of	   innate	  
preparedness,	   and	   that	   jointly	   account	   for	   the	   great	   bulk	   of	   culturally	   distributed	  
items	   falling	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   religion	   and	  morality.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   taking	  
into	   consideration	   data	   from	   non-­‐WEIRD	   populations	   (Henrich	   et	   al.,	   2010),	  
empirical	  work	  seeking	  to	  clarify	  relationships	  between	  religious	  and	  moral	  concepts	  
and	   behaviours	   should	   capitalize	   on	   this	   fractionating	   approach	   by	   expanding	   the	  
domain	   of	   relevant	   variables	   (for	   recent	   studies	   that	   have	   delineated	   a	   range	   of	  
moral	   outcomes	   in	   accordance	   with	   Moral	   Foundations	   Theory,	   see	   Cavrak	   and	  
Kleider-­‐Offutt,	   2014;	   Gervais,	   2014).	   In	   particular,	   researchers	   should	   seek	   to	  
characterise	  the	  range	  of	  “prosocial”	  outcomes	   (including	  outgroup	  aggression	  and	  
hostility)	   more	   comprehensively	   and,	   where	   possible,	   should	   distinguish	   between	  
parochial	   and	   more	   generalised	   variants	   of	   altruistic	   behaviours	   (e.g.,	   Reddish,	  
Bulbulia	   &	   Fischer,	   2013;	   Smith,	   Aquino,	   Koleva	   &	   Graham,	   2014).	   Research	   on	  
‘religion’	  and	  ‘morality’	  proceeds	  apace,	  but	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  gains	  that	  have	  been	  
made	   we	   must	   adopt	   higher	   standards	   of	   conceptual	   precision,	   a	   hallmark	   of	  
maturation	  in	  any	  field	  of	  science.	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Figure	   1.	   Views	   of	   religion	   and	   morality	   (Pew	   Research	   Global	   Attitudes	   Project,	  
2007;	  reprinted	  with	  permission).	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Figure	   2.	   Cultural	   representations	   (e.g.,	   propositions,	   prescriptions	   and	   practices	  
[green	  ovals])	  are	  triggered	  and	  constrained	  (blue	  arrows)	  by	  foundational	  cognitive	  
systems	   (“religious	   foundations”	   in	   blue	   boxes	   and	   “moral	   foundations”	   in	   pink	  
boxes).	   For	   instance,	   the	   proposition	   that	   “God	   will	   punish	   homosexuals”	   may	  
resonate	  with	   intuitions	  of	  observing,	   intentional	  agents	  and	  concerns	  about	  harm	  


















God will punish 
homosexuals 
Honour thy 
father and thy 
mother 
The ancestors 
are watching us 
Absolution ritual 
